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OVERALL INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation consists of two separate papers: the first deals 
with deposit interest rate controls on savings and loan associations 
(S&Ls) and the second is an economies of size study of the savings and 
loan industry. 
Deposit rate controls on deposits have been imposed upon S&L 
associations since 1966 when S&Ls found it difficult to compete with 
both commercial banks and the open market for deposit funds. Because 
S&Ls hold primarily long-term, fixed-rate assets (home mortgages) it is 
difficult for them to quickly increase che rates they pay to depositors 
(in the event that this becomes necessary). The rather rapid increases 
in interest rates in the mid-1960s proved to be too much of a competitive 
disadvantage for the S&Ls; hence, deposit rate controls were placed on 
S&L deposits and a more stringent policy was developed toward the 
already existing rate controls on commercial banks. All of this 
activity was uesioned to reduce deposit competition ainona the vctiitjub 
financial institutions. 
Now, in 1980, legislation has been passed which will phase out these 
deposit rate controls over the next six years. To lend insight into 
the current, past, and future problems of S&L associations with 
respect to their ability to compete in a dynamic financial environment, 
this first paper provides a historical look at both the S&L industry 
and the deposit rate controls themselves. This part also examines the 
recent financial position of all federally insured S&Ls in an effort to 
—ciiu J- CvjAiva J. » r 5 x'cii. L. -L 
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examines some recent developments effecting the S&L industry and suggests 
some changes which could be made so that S&Ls could more effectively 
compete in the financial environment of the 1980s. 
The second part of the dissertation is an economies of size 
study of the S&L industry. This paper examines the relationship 
between average operating expenses and firm size, this relationship 
is important for several different reasons. First, the individual 
SSL associations are interested in what will, on the average, happen 
to their operating costs if they expand their scale of operation. 
Secondly, the government regulators, who have considerable control over 
the size of individual associations through their branching and merger 
decisions, are interested in the results of an economies of size study. 
If the results, for example, indicate that large firms are more 
efficient, the regulators (everything else remaining constant) may want 
to encourage larger size firms. 
3 
PART I. SAVINGS AND LOAN DEPOSIT RATE CONTROLS: 
THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
4 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1966, deposit interest rate controls were placed on all 
federally regulated savings and loan associations (S&Ls) and mutual 
savings banks. These two financial institutions joined the plight of the 
commercial banks (CBs) who have had deposit rate controls since the 
early 1930s. Now, in 1980, steps have been taken by the federal 
government (the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act of 1980) to phase out these interest rate controls. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine these controls, particularly 
with respect to their implication for the savings and loan industry. 
In the hopes of providing the reader with a better insight into some of 
the problems which are facing the SSL industry today, this paper will 
give a brief historical overview of both the S&L industry and the rate 
controls themselves. This paper also examines the recent financial 
positions of all federally insured S&Ls in an attempt to provide some 
L. -Liiuv-/ uirc -Li lu L.I-v • dij-L uu w_LL.iiOuC. CicuOSxC. 
controls. Also discussed are some changes that could be iirplsir^ented 
to make it easier for the S&L industry to survive without these deposit 
rate controls. 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SSL ASSOCIATIONS^ 
The earliest predecessors of the modern savings and loan associa-
uj.On Wt^ ÎTC: Cilc: i.irî"cn0.xy 5GC%cu%05# lilcSc «ôiTô j.OC«â.-i-
of people which banded together to form cooperatives providing protec­
tion from such calamities as fire, death, illness, unemployment, etc. 
In a time when these insurance duties were not adequately provided by 
either the government or the business sector, groups of citizens would 
often organize to provide services which could not be provided to an 
individual by him/herself. 
This cooperative movement gradually moved into the home finance 
area; hence, the birth of the British building societies. These 
building societies consisted of groups of local citizens who joined 
together in an effort to mutually aid one another with home finance. 
Each member contributed a fixed amount of money (per week or month) to 
a central fund. When this fund grew large enough to make a home 
uu-ciicit>e. cue inùivlûucil Kieitibtdi S of che suciccy would bid to bet; wusj 
conrribuûions ÛO the central fund unril i- was, once again, large 
enough for another home purchase. The above process would then be 
repeated until each m.ember received a loan and ^ shortly thereafter, 
"The first several pages of this section are a summary of the fir 
99 pages of History of Building and Loan in the United States [5]. 
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the society would dissolve. 
British immigrants brought the concept of the building society 
to the United States and in 1831 the Oxford Provident Building Associa­
tion was formed in Frankford, Pennsylvania. This building association, 
patterned after the British building society, was quite successful 
and, gradually, the concept of the building association spread throughout 
the United States. These building associations provided a very 
necessary financial service during this particular time period. An 
increase in the manufacturing sector of the economy created a substantial 
class of wage earners who, in general, were not property owners. These 
people worked in factories and desired a stake in the community through 
home ownership. Even though these wage earners were not wealthy, they 
did earn enough to set aside a small portion of their income on a regular 
basis. Also contributing to the rise of these building associations 
was the apparent apathy of the commercial banks to the plight of the 
working person. At this time, banks were concerned primarily with 
financing business and government expenditures and not wizh the 
savings and credit problems of the average working citizen. 
In this fertile environment, these building associations prospered 
and eventually began an evolutionary process. The first major change 
occurred in the early 1850s as the building associations shifted frorp. 
a s£.lf-terminating organization to a ongoing business concern (serial 
operation). The second major revision came in the 1880s when a firm 
distinction was made between borrowers and savers (the permanent plan). 
Previously, people joined these associations with the intent of 
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eventually getting mortgage funding and, in most cases, were expected 
to take out a loan. Under the permanent plan, borrowers and savers 
were treated separately and one was free to buy shares of an association 
without the concurrent obligation of becoming a borrower; likewise, 
the borrowers were not expected to be savers. 
The permanent plan of operation yielded the type of savings and 
loan association that we know today: financial institutions that are 
primarily mutually owned (owned by their depositors), typically cater 
to the small saver, and invest heavily in fixed-rate home mortgages.^ 
This type of structure of the S&L industry (fixed-rate mortgages 
and short-term savings shares) worked relatively well (except for 
the panic of 1893 and the Great Depression) up until 1956. The 1950s 
and the early 1960s were characterized by relatively low (but steadily-
increasing) interest rates and a positively sloped yield curve. This 
environment was conducive for the SSL industry and it experienced rapid 
growth during the decade of the 1950s. Things changed in the mid-1960s 
with abrupt increases in market interest rates. This put the S&L 
industry ar a disadvantage ro both C3s and the open market for several 
reasons. First, given that the S&Ls hold primarily long-term, fixed-
rate assets, there is a relatively long time lag between the onset of 
an interest rate increase and the time SSL assnciatr;nns srp ahlp fo 
"Whereas the evolutionary roots of the current savings and loan 
associations place them, in the home mortgage businessj state and federal 
tax incentives and various other regulations. Federal and state 
regulations have also, for rhe mosz parr, xnsisred upon fixed-rate 
mortgages = 
8 
convert a significant portion of their assets into the higher interest 
earning type. Because CBs, in general, hold much shorter-term assets, 
this same type of conversion can occur with a much shorter time lag. 
If CBs can convert their assets into the higher interest earning type 
more quickly, this implies that they can also afford to pay their 
depositors a higher return for their funds than would be possible 
for the S&Ls. Since both CBs and S&Ls offer almost identical short-
term deposits, one would expect to see a shifr of deposit money from 
the S&Ls to the CBs. This type of shift, if it occurred to a large 
extent, would cause mass insolvency in the S&L industry. 
The S&Ls would also face a similar problem with the open market. 
A quick increase in open market rates would encourage a flow of funds 
out of the S&Ls as depositors responded to the subsequent interest 
rate differentials. 
A second problem created for the S&Ls is the negatively-sloped 
yield curve which often accompanies a quick increase in interest rates. 
This serves to compound the problem mentioned above. In this case, 
T) P'Rc -t-iTx-Ti rw^ air -f-noSv* acc:o4-c a 4- a —o -Hrnoco now 
assets earn a higher interest return than the new assets that the S&Ls 
are acquiring. 
X j i iKz.  j.iiuin=va j-cj. L.C1 u. Tzcr'jivvi iCTZ u c- Ciu \ _n i _L y 
the imposition of deposit rate ceilings on S&L associations and a more 
conservative approach to the already existing rate ceilings on CB 
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deposits.^ The stringency of the CB rate ceilings was designed to 
prevent the banks from competing funds away from the S&Ls and, thus, 
to temporarily maintain a more stable (than would otherwise be the case) 
flow of funds into the housing sector. The rate ceilings on the S&L 
deposits, it seems, were designed to protect the old S&L associations 
from the newer associations (ones not saddled with old, low-paying 
mortgages) as well as to protect the commercial banks from the S&Ls 
[8, page 15], With rate controls on both institutionsj a severe loss 
of funds from CBs to S&Ls would be prevented in times of unusually 
high interest rates. 
It should be noted, however, that these rate ceilings do not attack 
the real root of the problem but only enable the S&Ls to function 
under their current structure. The real problem is the mismatch of the 
maturity of S&L assets and liabilities: relatively short-term time and 
savings deposits and long-term, fixed-rate mortgages. 
"^Allowable rares on CB deposits were increased in 1957, 1962, 1965, 
1964, and 1965; however, these rates ceilings were decreased on some 
deposits in 1966 and further increases were not allowed until 1970. 
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HISTORY AND DISCUSSION OF 
DEPOSIT RATE CEILINGS 
Federal government regulation of deposit rates at financial 
institutions dates back to the 1930s when both the Federal Reserve 
System and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation received permission 
from Congress to set maxiirrom allowable deposit rates for commercial 
banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System and federally 
insured nonmember banks, respectively. The rationale for these ceilings 
was twofold [9, pages 22-23]. First, a zero percent ceiling was placed 
on demand deposits in an effort to reduce the quanticy of bankers-
balances that were being held at large money center banks. It was 
felt that the payment of interest on demand deposits was siphoning 
funds from the country banks and that these funds were primarily being 
used for stock market speculation. The prohibition of interest on 
demand deposits was designed to stop this flow of funds from the country 
banks -li!co crit; niùiiev ceiicëi/ banks êiiu. Lhus. séiTve Lhe dual runction or 
reducing speculation and keeping funds in the comm;unities from, which 
they originated. 
The second reason was to stop destructive rate competition among 
individual CBs, the reasoning being that, left alone, C3 competition 
for deposits (demand, time, and savings) would drive deposit rates to 
unreasonably high levels. In order to afford these expensive liabili­
ties, the banks would be forced to purchase assets of a higher risk 
-r- ri a n \*T n i (Z. t o-n i- m a ri 3 rrorno'n i- T'nSc 4 4-
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believed, would then lead to an excessive amount of bank failures. 
Using data from 1923-1934, George Benston [3] did a study to test 
the relationship between interest payments on demand deposits and the 
safety of the assets in which banks invested. He concluded that 
the data examined are inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
supports the prohibition of interest payments on demand deposits 
and are consistent with the hypothesis that supports repeal of 
the legislation [3, page 431]. 
A subsequent and more in depth study by Albert Cox, Jr. [9] 
yielded similar results. Using data from the 1920s and early 1930s, 
Cox found that a 
rank correlation analysis of banks of similar size and deposit: 
composition revealed no consistent relation between the level 
of interest rates that they were paying on deposits and measures 
of the quality of their assets [9, page Co]. 
Cox also found that 
a cross-section analysis of these banks, grouped within size-
composition categories into those institutions which survived 
the years 1930-33 intact and those which did not, showed no 
consistently lower deposit interest rates on the part of the 
surviving institutions [9, page 55], 
Both of the above mentioned studies find no support for the original 
reasons for deposit rate ceilings. However ; a 1973 study by Stanley 
Silverberg [23], using data from 1961 through 1970, found that 
there appears to be considerable evidence that banks adjusted 
their loan and investment portfolios toward higher yielding 
3 7-1/4 V 11 -t-VvCi-iv" v-\ 4 1 -v 4- 4  ^/-\ f I— 4-  ^
impact of increased deposit costs. They were willing to take 
 ^ Gzr o^ mo.v_.civ^ o ^ v. o. 000^ 1^10 2.11 
profits stemming from increased deposit costs 123, page 881]. 
Also, Carl Garnis [11] has used the mean-variance approach to portfolio 
t" 1 "f- o 4- m 4 /-« o 1 >^ 000 c T.rV>^  » -î 4- -> 
positive relationship becween inceresu payirieni: on demand deposits and 
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the risk of bank assets. 
To summarize, the empirical and theoretical results of the 
"correctness" in the reasoning of the original rationale for deposit 
rate ceilings are mixed. Intuitively, these rate ceilings do represent 
a drastic restriction of CB competition and the removal of these 
ceilings would, of course, increase bank competition. Along with this 
extra competition one would expect to see an increase in the number of 
bank failures: predicting the extent of this increase would be pure 
conjecture. 
In 1965, the deposit rate ceilings took on a new sense of importance 
as their coverage was expanded to include not only the CEs, but also 
S&Ls. The inability of S&Ls to compete with CBs (as has been previously 
discussed) created a new reason for maintaining deposit rate controls. 
The gradually increasing interest rates of the 1950s and early 1960s 
produced no probiens for the S&Ls; however, the high market interest 
rates resulting from a tight monetary policy in 1956 and subsequent 
periods of high inflation in the late 1950s and 1970s proved to be too 
much of a burden for the SSLs. 
Deposit rate ceilings on S&L associations have been in effect now 
for almost 15 years. This leads to the question of the current 
i 1 d O -C V O ^ V CI -k. V V—A X lO O %_* -A. Nw** A  ^  ^  ^ X.» TW Sa'W W» W s— Sa. S.» — —• 
ings. A following section of this paper (A TEST OF THE SSL PROTECTION 
RATIONALE FOR DEPOSIT RATE CEILINGS) examines this question by looking at 
the recent financial positions of the federally insured S&Ls. 
The results of rhis study indicate that rhe rare ceilings 
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are necessary and that the SSLs would have a difficult time paying a 
rate much higher than what they currently do. 
A third rationale for deposit rate ceilings surfaced in the early 
1950s. That is, these ceilings could be used "to help control credit 
and monetary aggregates, and therby aggregate demand for goods and 
services in the economy" [28, page 15]. The argument here is that 
lowering the ceiling rate on bank deposits would slow the rate of 
growth of these deposits, reduce the rate of growth of bank credit, 
and thus reduce inflationary pressures. 
Whereas it is certainly recognized that deposit rate ceilings are 
capable of causing changes in monetary aggregates^ and, to some extent, 
may also serve to control the quantity of credit, it is not felt that 
these ceilings have a significant impact on aggregate demand. An 
example may serve to illustrate this point. Suppose the rate ceilings on 
all time and savings deposits at CBs are simultaneously reduced. This 
move would m.ake saving at CBs less attractive and would certainly 
reduce the banking systems ability to compete for funds. The result 
not mean that aggregate demand has fallen. 
Making time and savings deposits less attractive will cause the 
For example, low ceixings on savings aeposits reiarive to open 
rates would cause a 
:e supply of money. 
iwdLiac u wuu o-. Sc. v .Liiy a va.tru.'wis-i.uo a uv., i 
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of high-powered money, the quantity of will increase. Now consider 
what would have happened to the funds that would have gone into C3 
time and savings deposits but did not because of the reduced rate 
ceilings. These funds could (1) be spend directly on goods and 
services, (2) be placed in some alternative savings instrument (a money 
market mutual fund, for example), or (3) be held as idle demand deposit 
balances. If people select alternative one or two (seemingly the most 
likely choices), there is no reason to expect a fall in velocity. 
A constant velocity in conjunction with a larger would actually 
result in an increase in aggregate demand; the opposite of the intended 
effect of the rate ceilings. With option three velocity will fall, but 
even here it is not clear what the net effect will be as this lower 
velocity may be counterbalanced by the larger money supply. The net 
result is unclear. 
However, since the early 1970s, deposit rate ceilings have not 
been actively used in an effort to adjust aggregate demand. The Federal 
Reserve has since used its general -ools to accomplish this goal 
[28, page 16]. 
In summary, the main reason deposit rate ceilings are currently in 
effect is to offer protection to the S&L associations. However, it 
should be noted that even if the pr-oble^ with the is resolved. 
rate ceilings may still be desirable as a measure to reduce competition 
among financial institutions. 
15 
PROBLEMS WITH THE DEPOSIT 
RATE CEILING SOLUTION 
These ceilings ; while protecting the SÇ'Ls fro?, the CBs, fail to 
offer protection from the open market: but, more importantly they fail 
to give the S&L industry the necessary tools so that they can compete 
with both the CBs and the open market. As open market rates become 
substantially higher than the binding ceiling rates that are offered 
at financial intermediaries, an incentive is created for depositors to 
shift their savings from intermediary deposits into open market 
instruments. This, so called disinterm.ediation, resulted in a decrease 
in the rate of growth of deposits (and in some cases, a negative rate 
of growth) for banks and S&Ls in 1966, 1969-1970, and 1973-1974; all 
being times of rapidly rising open market interest rates. 
In an attempt to reduce the disintermediation problem, federal 
authorities allowed CBs and S&Ls to introduce the Money Market Certifi-
a maximum, rate which is tied to the 6-month Treasury/ bill rate. This 
Treasury bill substitute has decreased the disintermediation problem 
increased development of money market mutual funds [S, page 24], These 
funds typically have m.inim.um deposit requirements of considerably less 
than $10,000 but pay a return which is in line with that offered on 
MMCs, As a result; these mutual founds have attracted the funds of som.r 
dcposicors who are unable co meet une minzmurn. collar recuirem.ents of t. 
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MMC. It appears, however, that the overall impact of the MMCs has been 
a reduction in the amount of disintermediation relative to what would 
have otherwise occurred. 
Whereas the MMCs have decreased disintermediation, the problem 
still remains. Rising open market rates will result in a decrease in 
the rate of growth of deposits at CBs and SSLs. Hardest hit is the 
housing market where borrowers have few alternative sources of funds 
other than the financial institutions. Thus, the deposit rate ceilings 
serve to make the housing industry more cyclical than would be the case 
if S&Ls could effectively compete for funds. 
The disintermediation problem may also rob the housing market of 
funds in a secondary manner. The prospects of current and future 
disintermediation places the S&Ls in a more uncertain position with 
respect to future deposit flows [14, page 923]. This additional uncer­
tainty may cause, within certain limits, the S&Ls to increase their 
liquidity position: however, this would imply fewer funds invested in 
home m.ortgages • 
/-\ c 4 4- /-« <3 4 1 4 3m. rv ^  In T) T ra 3 1 c v a 1r-i i i 4 4- -i a c "F 4-r^  ^
small saver [13, page 513]. The small saver being one who, for various 
reasons, must rely solely on financial institutions as a savings outlet 
"'"Some CBs and SSLs have recently circ'jmvented this minimum deposit 
requirement by offering what has been called the "loophole certificate" 
[28, page 10]. With this certificate, the institution lends the saver 
saver is som.ewhat lower than would be the case if the full $10,000 were 
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investor has many investment opportunities available for their funds. 
Minimum deposit requirements are not a problem and these large investors 
are typically more familiar with different investment alternatives. 
Hence, it is easier for the large investor to earn a market determined 
rate of return on his/her money. The story is different for the small 
saver who is limited to financial institutions as a savings outlet. 
This situation tends to result in a shift in purchasing power from the 
small to the large saver and it also tends to discourage saving. With 
a relatively high rate of inflation the real return for the small 
saver becomes significantly negative. This realization of a 
deteriorating wealth position can only serve to discourage saving. 
An additional cost to the small saver may be a decrease in his/her 
liquidity position. The current rate ceilings are designed such that, 
in general, the longer the maturity of the deposits, the higher is the 
allowable deposit rate (except for the IwIC). If the small saver is 
limited only to financial institutions, and if the inflation rate is 
high, an attemp- may be made co shift deposits into the longer maturity 
accounts in an effort to avoid a severe deterioration in the real value 
the savers own money. This certificate has allowed for a somewhat 
higher yield for some small savers, but still not at par with the 
The small saver may also take advantage of a 2 1/2-year certificate 
introduced on January 1, 1980. This certificate had no minimum, 
denomination requirements and has a ceiling rate pegged to the average 
yield on 2 1/2-year United States Treasury securities (however, there 
IS a rate cap of 11 3/4 percent for C3s and 12 percent for thrift 
institutions). This instrument is less liquid chan the MMC and, in 
•J- *1 m o c oT 1 TT -a, T . 1 1 _ i i _ _ —_ _ - -
— ---r— ^ — C4. 
lower yield rhan will the KMC. 
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of the saver's funds. Thus, the small saver may end up holding longer 
maturity assets than would otherwise be the case. 
Deposit rate ceilings serve to reduce deposit competition among 
all of the affected financial institutions. This reduction in competi­
tion may cause the institions to become lethargic and, hence, less 
efficient [15, page 328]. This inefficiency would impose costs upon 
society in that more resources will be used in the intermediation 
process than would be the case in a mors competitive atmosphere. 
Resources may also be spent as these financial institutions attempt to 
circumvent the controls [10, pages 25-27]. This might involve time 
spent looking for loopholes in existing regulations or, as was the case 
in 1959, the channeling of funds through the Eurodollar market in order 
to pay some depositors a higher return on their funds [10, pages 24-25], 
Finally, various forms of nonprice competition have surfaced in 
an effort to circumvent the deposit rate ceilings. The institutions 
may maintain longer operating hours, offer premiums with deposits, etc. 
in an attempt to attract extra deposits. This is also inefficient in 
that customers would derive a higher degree of satisfaction if they 
were simply given money payments instead of the extra service and/or 
gifts. 
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A TEST OF THE S&L PROTECTION RATIONALE 
FOR DEPOSIT RATE CEILINGS 
Tha validity of the hypothesis that d^posic race ceilings are 
necessary involves the examination of the recent financial positions 
of individual S&L associations. With income, expense, and balance 
sheet information on individual S&Ls, it is possible to (1) see how 
much of a rate increase the S&Ls can afford to pay out of current 
earnings and (2) see how long individual S&Ls can last if deposit rates 
rise, given they have the opportunity to draw upon their accumulated 
reserves. 
If S&Ls can pay a significantly greater percentage on deposits than 
what they are currently paying, there may be no need for the deposit 
rate ceilings. However, ever if this is not true, it may be the case 
individual S&Ls are holding such a large quantity of reserves that 
they may be able to last through short periods of unusually high 
i^Le^cau j-di-cs by dimply did-wing upon rhese reserves. zs recognizee 
•.O >> V >  ^ : o n : iTiv- >-v -r 
. O*-» si. WJ- -i-liO. vao L.J. y , 
Methods and Results 
Tne data were obtained from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (they 
are only for federally insured S&Ls) and cover three separate tim.e 
periods: the second half of 1978 and the first and second halves of 1979 
In each case, income and expense data pertain to the entire half year; 
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on the last day of the half year in question (December 31, 1978, June 30, 
1979, and December 31, 1979, respectively). The following experiments 
were applied to each data tape separately; no attempt was made to 
combine the information on the three tapes. 
In terms of definitions, an increase in deposit rates refers to 
an increase in the rate paid on all interest bearing accounts at the 
SSL with the exception of the negotiable certificates of deposits (NCDs). 
The KCDs are not subject to rate ceilings and it is assumed that they 
are already earning a market return. Using this rationale, one might 
argue that MMCs should also be excluded from the analysis; however, 
data limitations prevented this. 
Capacity to Pay Higher Rates 
To find the capacity of the federally insured S&Ls to pay higher 
rates of return to depositors out of current net before-tax income the 
following equation was used for each S&L. 
R = " ~ X 100 (1) 
where 
R = percentage point increase in rate of return, 
NI = net income of the association, 
T = total income taxes of rhe association. 
1 
SC, please see the Appendix. 
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The results for December 31, 1978 are listed in table 1, those for 
June 30, 1979 are in table 2, and the December 31, 1979 results are in 
falling into each of the listed rate categories, column (2) lists the 
percentage of the total number of associations which fall into each rate 
category, and column (3) lists the percentage of total assets held by 
the firms in each rate category. The derivations of columns (4) through 
(7) are self-explanatory. 
The cumulative results in column (5) can be interpreted as showing 
the number of associations that cannot pay more than the upper limit of 
the listed rate category. For example, from table 1, 95 associations 
could not pay more than what they were paying in the second half of 
1978 (due to either negative or zero net incomes), 145 could not pay 
more than two-tenths of one percent more, etc. 
These results show several points. First, a large number of S&Ls 
their average rate. On December 31. 1979 (table 3); 1911 associations 
could not afford more than a one percentage point increase on their 
average savings deposits from their current net before-tax income. 
Second, the general position of the SSL industry has deteriorated over 
the time periods tested. An examination of column (1) reveals an 
increase in the number of associations which fall into the lower rate 
& corr.parison of cables 1 and 2 shows a decrease in che nuirier of 
associations in the higher rate categories (as one might expect) the 
Table J,. Capacity of insured savings and loan associations to pay higher rates of return to 
depositors out. of current net before-tax income, December 31, 1978. 
( 1 )  ( 2 )  
Percentage Point 
Increa£;e in Rate Percent o) 
of Return (R) Number Total 
R < 0.0 96 2.37 
0.0 < 1^ < 0.2 50 1.24 
0.2 R < 0.4 94 2.32 
0.4 R < 0.6 159 3.93 
0. (> < 0.0 328 0.10 
o.n < R < 1.0 434 10.72 
1.0 R 1.2 609 15.04 
1.2 < R < 1.4 666 16.45 
1.4 < R < 1.6 560 13.83 
l.(. < R < 1.8 382 9.44 
l.ll < R < 2.0 259 6. 40 
2.0 < R < 2.2 155 3.83 
2.2 < R < 2.4 91 2.25 
2.4 < R < 2.6 55 1.36 
2.(. < R 2.8 32 0.79 
2.H n < 3.0 21 0.52 
R > 3.0 57 1.41 
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Cumulative Cumulative 
Percent of Columns Cumulative Percent of Percent of 
Assets (3)/(2) Number Total Assets 
1.04 0.44 96 2.37 1.04 
0.64 0.52 146 3.61 1.68 
1.74 0.75 240 5.93 3.42 
2.43 0.62 399 9.86 5.85 
6.16 0.76 727 17.96 12.01 
8.72 0.01 1161 28.68 20.73 
11.86 0.79 1770 43.72 32.59 
16.76 1.02 2436 60.17 49.35 
12.52 0,91 2996 74.00 61.87 
10.08 1.07 3378 83.44 71.95 
4.56 0.71 3637 89.84 76.51 
8.87 2.32 3792 93.67 85.38 
3.38 1.50 3883 95.92 08.76 
4.52 3.32 3938 97.28 93.28 
1.90 2.41 3970 98.07 95.18 
1.56 3.00 3991 98.59 96.74 
3.26 2.31 4048 100.00 100.00 
Table 2, Capacity of insurixl saving and loan associations to pay higher rates of return to 
depositors out of current net before-tax income, June 30, 1979. 
I'ercentage Point 
Increase in Rate 
of Return (R) 
(1) 
Number 
(2) 
Percent of 
Total 
(3) 
Percent of 
Assets 
(4) 
Columns 
(3) / (2)  
(5) 
Cumulative 
Number 
(6) 
Cumulative 
Percent of 
Total 
(7) 
Cumulât 
Percent 
Asset; 
U 0.0  179 4.43 2.66 0.60 179 4.43 2 .66 
O o A 0.2  90 2.23 2 .12 0.95 269 6,66 4.78 
o
 
A 0.4  165 4 .08 2 .38 0 .58 434 10.7  4 5 .32 
o
 
A < 0.6 283 7.00 4.11 0.59 717 17.75 11.28 
o
 (TI A 0.8  489 12.10 10.30 0.85 1206 29.85 21.57 
V C
O o
 1.0 533 13.19 11.31 0.86 1739 43.04 32.88 
1 . 0 < N  < 1.2 603 14.93 15.57 1.04 2342 57.97 48.46 
1.2 < R < l./l 537 13.29 12.86 0.97 2879 71.26 61.32 
1.4 < R 1.6 434 10.74 12.11 1.13 3313 82.00 73.42 
1.6 < R G 1 .8  284 7.03 6.25 0 .89 3597 89.03 79.68 
1.8 < R < 2.0 164 4 .06 5 .24 1.29 3761 93.09 84.91 
2 .0  < U :< 2.2  112 2.77 5.11 1.84 3873 95.87 90.03 
2 .2  < H < 2.4 64 1 .58 4 .28 2 .71 3937 97.45 94.31 
2 .4  < K :< 2.6  30 0 .74 2 .37 3 .20 3967 98.19 96.68 
2 .6  < R •< 2.8  16 0.40 2 .57 6 .43 3983 98.59 99.24 
2 .8  < N < 3.0 15 0.37 0.22 0.59 3998 98.96 99.47 
R > 3.0 42 1 .04 0 .53 0 .51 4040 100.00 100.00 
Table 3„ Capacity of insur(x3 savincf; and loan associations to pay higher rates of return to 
depositors out of current net before-tax income, December 31, 1979. 
Percentage Point 
increase in Rate 
of Return (R) 
(1) 
Number 
(2)  
Percent cf 
Total 
(3) 
Percent of 
Assets 
(4) 
Columns 
(3) / (2)  
(5) 
Cumulative 
Number 
(6) 
Cumulative 
Percent of 
Total 
(7) 
Cumulative 
Percent of 
Assets 
R < 0 . 0  252 6 .24 4.52 0.72 252 6 .24 4 .52 
CM o
 
Vi V 
o
 129 3.19 2.54 0.80 381 9.44 7.06 
0.2  < R <  0 .4  234 5 .79 4 .27 0.74 615 15.23 11.33 
0,4 < < 0.6 330 0 .37 6.09 0.73 953 23.60 17.41 
0.6  <K < 0 . 8  444 11,00 10.49 0 ,95 1397 34.60 27.91 
o
 
r—
i 
Vi V 
o
 514 12.73 12.21 0.96 1911 47.33 40.11 
1.0 < R < 1.2 550 13.62 13.20 0.97 2461 60.95 53.32 
1.'/ < R 5:' 1.4 485 12.01 10.24 0.85 2946 72.96 63.56 
1.4 < R < 1.6 343 0 .49 8 .63 1 .02 3289 81.45 72.18 
CO 1—
i 
V; V 
1—
i 
259 6 .41 7 .32 1.14 3549 87.89 79.50 
1.{I < R < 2.0 165 4 ,09 4 .27 1 .04 3713 91.95 03.78 
2 . 0  < R  < 2 . 2  93 2.30 3.81 1.66 3806 94.25 07.58 
2 . % < R  < 2 . 4  60 1 .60 4.72 2.81 3874 95,94 92.32 
2 .4  < R <  2 .6  44 1 ,09 3 .45 3.17 3918 97.03 95.75 
2.N < R <  2 .8  24 0 .59 1 .18 2 .00 3942 97.62 96.93 
2.1! < R < 3.0 22 0 .54 1 .84 3.41 3964 98.17 98.77 
R > 3 . 0  74 1.03 1 .23 0.67 4038 100.00 100.00 
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opposite is true for a comparison of tables 2 and 3. This latter 
comparison shows an increase in the number of associations in the higher 
rate categories (rates greater that 2.2 percent). This appears to be 
an exception to the general trend as a small nuiaoer of association nave 
experienced an increase in their income positions. 
This general deterioration is probably due, in large part, to the 
rapid growth in MMCs at SSLs. In December 1978 MMCs accounted for only 
10,1 percent of total deposits at SSLs, By July 1979 this percentage 
had increased to 20.2 and further growth caused this percentage to 
increase to 27.6 by December 1979 122, page 2], Ml'-iCs have been one of 
the most expensive sources of funds for the SSLs and an increase in 
their volume has certainly increased the cost of doing business for 
the SSLs. 
Column (4) serves to indicate the relative size of the associations 
in each rate category. A value in column (4) greater than one would 
imply that the associations in that particular category are typically 
of above average size; likewise, a value less than one for a particular 
category would be indicative of smaller than average associations. 
An examination of tables 1 througn 3 snows tnat it is generally the 
smaller associations which have the relatively weaker income positions. 
An exception to this appears in tables 2 and 3 in the higher rate 
categories. These two tables show the existence of some relatively 
high income earning small associations. 
in-i-ow CO V- -i-o uirc U.J. OOCXJO wciy nc— 
4- i •Hno'i'v v-v -r* 'Ko'Fp'v -rs'^TtQ 
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allowing them to dip into some "reserves" that they may have. The 
scenario goes as follows. Assume that the individual S&L maintains the 
same income, expense, assets, and liability position as they did in the 
second half of 1978. Then how long could the individual S&L last, 
given some deposit rate increase, provided they were allowed to dip 
into some "reserve" fund. 
The time an individual association could last can be determined by 
the following equation. 
Y= . %ESi 
(SC X R) - I(NI + T) X 2] 
where 
Y = the number of years the individual association can last,^ 
2 RES^ = the dollar volume of reserve fund i, i = 1, 2, and 3, 
R = increase in the average deposit rate. 
RES^ is equal to the accumulated retained earnings of the firm 
(undivided profits plus net undistributed income) and the results are 
uroviùwâ in cable 4, For each increase in che average deposir rare 
(10, ? cl ^ p. =* tk.'m p. 7-\ovf- ^ v*/-nt.r ! 1 ^  o =» _ 
i uw u-line: \^ J uiic vjcii u kjj-
T t  V  1  l o c c  Y - C & T  1  4  r r  - f - r \ o  - r s i z - i - f -  - r - r t a - f -  / " C / ^  v  
is less than I (NI -f T) x 2], it is assumed the association will be 
akl# i- lac-?- -îo-f-i-n-i-f-o! TT 
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the total number of associations that fall into each time category, 
and row (3) lists the percent of total assets held by these associations. 
The derivations of rows (4) through (7) are self-explanatory. 
Row (5) can be interpreted as showing the number of S&Ls unable to 
pay the higher rate for the upper limit of the time category. For 
example (from table 4), if the deposit rate increased by one percentage 
point, 253 S&Ls would not be able to last as long as one year, 350 would 
not be able to last as long as two years, etc. 
This same experiment was repeated using a second measure of 
reserves, RES^, where RES^ is equal to RES^ plus the bad-debt reserves 
of the S&L (Federal insurance reserves plus reserves qualifying for 
Federal insurance reserves plus general reserves plus other reserves). 
These results are given in table 5. It should be noted, however, that 
the bulk of RES^ are specifically designated as bad-debt reserves and 
can only be used if the S&L incurs a loss on a loan. These reserves are 
not available to be used in the sole event that expenses exceeds income 
for the association. It would also be undesirable to let individual 
S&Ls get into a position where all or almost all of their reserves are 
liquidated to pay for cronic operating losses. 
RES^ is equal to RES^ plus stock (permanent, reserve, and guaranty 
shows the absolute maximum tine period the S&Ls could last. Once RES_ 
IS gone, the SSL becomes insolvent. It should be noted, that there is 
only a difference between RES and RES^ for the stock associations as 2 j 
mutuals do not issue stock. 
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The above three experiments were repeated using RES^» RES^, and 
RES^ for the June 30, 1979 data and the results are presented in tables 
7, 8, and 9, respectively. The December 31, 1979 results are listed in 
tables 10, 11, and 12. 
These results yield the following conclusions. First, given that 
the S&Ls realistically only have access to RES^, a relatively large 
number of S&Ls would experience difficulty if they were forced to pay 
rates much higher than what they were paying during the time periods 
tested. For example, looking at the December 31, 1979 results, suppose 
deposit rates increased, on the average, two percent. If S&Ls have 
access only to RES^ (table 10, row 5), 1730 S&Ls will not be able to 
last as long as two years. Examination of the RES2 results leads to 
more optimistic results in that only 298 would not be able to last the 
two years; however, it is doubtful that it would be desirable (or 
politically acceptable) for even this number to experience insolvency. 
Second, these results substantiate the previous claim.s that the 
financial position of the S&L industry has generally deteriorated over 
the time periods considered. Examination of the RES^ results reveals a 
consistent increase in the number of associations in the lower time 
catsQories as one moves from table 4 to table 7 to table 10. The RES 2 
\ UCLO-'a. ^ Oy dliv-*. _L _L y -L\ Ly UllC OCJJ.U'S U-i- CiiVi. 00 WilO 
compares tables 5 and 8; however^ a comparison of tables 8 and 11 shows 
a decrease in the n^umber of associations in some of the lower rate 
categories. This is reflective of the improved income positions of 
cr>'mo a c <= o/- 4 a +- 4 c a c wa c coo*-i 4 v-t a v* 4 c:r\-n -f-aKloc "P T'Vi o 
Ttiblo 4, Capacity of insured savings and loan associations to pay higher rates of return to 
depositors out of current net before-tax income plus accumulated retained earnings, 
Decem})er 31, 1970. 
i:(.'asG Numoer of Years the Individual Associations Can Last (Y): 
ite of 
rn (R) 0 < Y < 1 1 < Y < 2 2 < Y < 3 3 < Y .< 4 4 < Y 5: 5 5 < Y < ] 0 10 < Y 5; 15 Y> 15 
(1) Number 253 107 96 71 67 202 115 3137 
(2) % of Total 6.25 2.64 2.37 1.75 1.66 4.99 2.84 77.50 
(3) 'b of Assets 3.69 1.61 1.56 1.89 1.62 3.78 1.74 84.11 
1.0% (4) (3)/(2) 0.59 0.61 0.66 1.08 0.98 0.75 0.61 1.09 
(5) Cum/^ Number 253 360 456 527 594 796 911 4048 
(6) Cum. % of Total 6.25 8.89 11.26 13.01 14.67 19.66 22.50 100.00 
(7) Cum. % of Assets 3.69 5.30 6.86 8.75 10.37 14.15 15.09 100.00 
(1) Number 767 695 487 380 273 561 166 719 
(2) % of Total 18.95 17.17 12.03 9.39 6.74 13.86 4.10 17.76 
(3) 'k of Assets 12.59 16.33 10.68 9.58 6.09 12.22 3.42 29.10 
2.0% (4) How (3)/(2) 0.66 0.95 0.89 1.02 0.90 0.88 0.83 1.64 
(5) Cum. Number 767 1462 1949 2329 2602 3163 3329 4048 
(6) Cum. % of Tot:al 1H.95 36.12 48.15 57.54 64.28 78.14 82.24 100.00 
(7) Cum, % of Assets 12,59 28.92 39,60 49.18 55.27 67.49 70.91 100.00 
(1) Number ] 596 1185 576 
(2) % of Total 3Ç .43 29.27 14.23 
(3) % of Assets 3/ .64 27.54 13.60 
3.0% (4) Row (3)/(2) C' .83 0.94 0.96 
(5) Cum. Number ] 596 2781 3357 
(6) Cum . % of Total 39 .43 68.70 82.93 
(7) Cum. % of Assets 32 .64 60.18 73.78 
(1) Number /L :i95 1159 333 
(2) % of Total 59 .17 28.63 8.23 
(3) % of Assets 52 .68 29.60 12.01 
4.0% (4) Row (3)/(2) (1 .89 1.03 1.46 
(5) Cum. Number : 395 3554 3887 
(6) Cum, . % of Total 59 ,17 87.80 96.03 
(7) Cum. % of Assets 52 .,68 82.28 94.29 
= Cumulative. 
260 
6.42 
5.16 
0.80 
3617 
89.35 
78.94 
80 
1.98 
1.32 
0.67 
3967 
98.01 
95.61 
145 
3.58 
6.50 
1 .82  
3762 
92.92 
85.44 
29 
0.72 
1.25 
1.74 
3996 
98.73 
96.86 
170 
4.20 
8.58 
2.04 
3932 
97.13 
94.02 
23 
0.57 
2.59 
4.54 
4019 
99,30 
99.45 
26 
0.64 
0.63 
1.30 
3958 
97.70 
94.85 
4 
0 . 1 0  
0.03 
0.30 
4023 
99.40 
99.48 
90 
2 . 2 2  
5.15 
2.32 
4048 
100.00 
100.00 
25 
0.62  
0.52 
0.84 
4048 
100.00 
100.00 
Table 5, Capacity of insured savings and loan associations to pay higher rates of return to 
depositors out of current net before-tax income plus accumulated retained earnings 
and bad-debt reserves,, December 31, 1978. 
case Number of Years the Individual Associations Can Last (Y); 
ite of 
•n (R) o< y < 1 1 < Y < 2 2 < Y < 3 3 < Y < 4 4 < Y 5 5 < Y < 10 10 < Y;: 15 Y >15 
(1) Number 63 39 26 23 30 157 143 3567 
(2) % of Total 1.56 0.96 0.64 0.57 0.74 3.88 3.53 88.12 
(3) % of Assets 0.20 0.31 0.09 0.27 0.50 3.21 2.79 92.63 
1.0% (4) Row (3)/(2) 0.13 0.32 0.14 0.47 0.68 0.83 0.79 1.05 
(5) Cum.'^ Number 63 102 128 151 181 338 481 4048 
(6) Cum. % of Total 1.56 2.52 3.16 3.73 4.47 8.35 11.88 100.00 
(7) Cum, % of Assets 0.20 0.51 0.60 0.87 1.37 4.58 7.37 100.00 
(1) Number 131 103 157 250 326 1262 560 1259 
(2) % of Total 3.24 2.54 3.88 6.18 8.05 31.18 13.83 31.10 
(3) % of Assets C.46 0.81 2.88 5.87 5.92 30.14 12.73 41.20 
2.0% (4) Row (3)/(2) C . 14 0.32 0.74 0.95 0.74 0.97 0.92 1.33 
(5) Cum. Number 131 234 391 641 967 2229 2789 4048 
(6) Cun. % of Total 2.24 5.78 9.66 15.84 23.89 55.07 68.90 100.00 
(7) Cum. % of Assets 0,46 1.27 4.15 10.02 15 .94 46.08 58.81 100.00 
(1) Number 212 375 843 
(2) % of Tota1 5.24 9.26 20.83 
(3) % of Assets 0.92 6.28 18.65 
(4) How (3)/(2) 0.18 0.68 0.90 
(5) Cum. Number 212 587 1430 
(6) Curn. % oJ: Total 5.24 14.50 35.33 
(7) Cum,, % of Assets 0.92 7.20 25.85 
(1) Number 349 1163 1308 
(2) % of Total 8.62 28.73 32.31 
(3) % of Assets 2.31 25.98 33.43 
(4) Row (3)/(2) 0.27 0.90 1.03 
(5) Cum. Number 349 1512 2820 
(6) Cum . % of Total 8.62 37.35 69.66 
(7) Cum, % of Assets 2.31 28.29 61.72 
'^cum, =: Cumulative. 
792 
19.57 
21.54 
1.10 
2222  
54. 90 
47.39 
545 
15.93 
14.59 
0.92 
3465 
85.59 
76.31 
606 
14.97 
14.37 
0.96 
2828 
69.87 
61.76 
312 
7.71 
14.19 
1.84 
3777 
93.30 
90.50 
916 
22.63 
22.39 
0.99 
3744 
92.50 
84.15 
227 
5.61 
6.51 
1.16 
4004 
98.91 
97.01 
150 
3.71 
7.55 
2.04 
3894 
96.21 
91.70 
11 
0.27 
2.32 
8.59 
4015 
99.18 
99.03 
154 
3.80 
8.33 
2.19 
4048 
100.00 
100.00 
33 
0 .82  
0.67 
0.82 
4048 
100.00 
100.00 
Table 6. Capacity of insured savings and loan associations to pay higher rates of return to 
(lopositojrs out of current not before-tax income plus accumulated retained earnings, 
bad <1 ebt reserves, and stock, December 31, 1978. 
Number of Years the Individual Associations Can Last (Y); 
0  <  Y  <  1  1 < Y < 2  2 < Y < 3  3 < Y < 4  4 < Y < 5  5 < Y < 1 0  1 0 < Y < 1 5  Y ^ 1 5  
(1) Number 30 23 21 18 27 162 153 3614 
(2) % of Total 0.74 0.57 0.52 0. 44 0.67 4.00 3.78 89.28 
(3) % of Assets 0.09 0.25 0.07 0. 21 0.52 3.20 2.86 92.80 
.0% (4) Row (3 )/(?.) 0.12 0.44 0.13 0. 48 0.78 0.80 0.76 1.04 
(5) Cum.^ Number 30 53 74 92 119 281 434 4048 
(6) Cum. % of Total 0.74 1.31 1.83 2. 27 2.94 6.94 10.72 100.00 
(7) (]um, % of Ass ets 0.09 0.34 0.41 0. 62 1.14 4.34 7.20 100.00 
Increase 
in Rate of 
R(îturn (fT) 
(1) Number 58 61 134 255 334 1296 589 1321 
(2) % of Total ;i. .43 1.51 3.31 6.30 8.25 32.02 14.55 32.63 
(3) % of Assets 0 .22 0,53 2.47 5.66 6.43 30.22 12.39 42.10 
(4) Row (3)/(2) 0 .15 0.35 0.75 0.90 0.78 0.94 0.85 1.29 
(5) Cum. Number 58 119 253 508 842 2138 2727 4048 
(6) Cum, % of Total 1 .43 2.94 6.25 12.55 20.80 52.82 67.37 100.00 
(7) Cum, % of Assets 0 .22 0.75 3.22 8.88 15.31 45.53 57.92 100.00 
(1) Number 91 300 072 
(2) % of Total 2.25 7.41 21.54 
(3) % of Assets C.38 4.98 19.58 
3.0% (4) Row (3)/(2) C.17 0.67 0.91 
(5) Cum. Number 91 319 1263 
(6) Cuii , % of Total 2,25 9.66 31.20 
(7) Cum. % of Assets C.38 5.36 24.94 
(1) Number 173 1143 1357 
(2) % of Total 4.27 28.24 33.52 
(3) % of Assets 1.26 25.57 33.38 
4.0% (4) Row (3)/(2) C.30 0.91 1.00 
(5) Cum. Number J.73 1316 2673 
(6) Curii. % of Total 4.27 32.51 66.03 
(7) Cum. % of Assets 1.26 26.83 60.21 
'^Cum. := Cumulative. 
810 
20.01 
20.77 
1.04 
2073 
51.21 
45.71 
684 
16.90 
14.93 
0.88  
3357 
82.93 
75.13 
626 
15.46 
13.99 
0.90 
2699 
66.67 
59.70 
342 
8.45 
12.99 
1.54 
3699 
91.38 
88.12 
991 
24.48 
24.04 
0.98 
3690 
91.15 
83.74 
267 
6.60 
8.81 
1.33 
3966 
97.98 
96.93 
154 
3.80 
5.80 
1.53 
3844 
94.95 
89.54 
29 
0.72 
2.38 
3.32 
3995 
98.70 
99.32 
204 
5.04 
10.49 
2.08 
4048 
100.00 
100.00 
53 
1.31 
0.70 
0.53 
4048 
100.00 
100.00 
Ta))] G 7„ Capacity of insurcDd saving <; and loan associations to pay higher rates of return to 
depositors out of current net before-tax income plus accumulated retained earnings, 
June 30, 1979. 
Increase Number of Years the Individual Associations Can Last (Y); 
in Rate of 
Return (R) 0<y<ll<Y<2 2<Y<3 3<Y<4 4<Y:S5 5<Y<10 10<Y:S15 Y>15 
(1) Number 316 187 154 127 123 309 160 2664 
(2) % of Total .82 4.63 3.81 3.14 3.04 7.65 3.95 65.94 
(3) % of Assets L .45 3.47 2.55 2.43 2.76 6.19 3.18 74.98 
(4) Row (3)/(2) 0 „57 0.75 0.67 0.77 0.91 0.81 0.80 1.14 
(5) Cum.^ Number 316 503 657 784 907 1216 1376 4040 
(6) Cum. % of Total .82 12.45 16.26 19.41 22.45 30.10 34.06 100.00 
(7) Cum. % of Assets I „45 7.92 10.45 12.88 15.64 21.82 25.00 100.00 
(1) Number 874 782 541 369 223 556 172 523 
(2) % of Total 21.63 19.36 13.39 9.13 5.52 13.76 4.26 12.95 
(3) % of Assets 15 „31 16.92 13.96 9.80 5.40 13.49 3.70 21.42 
(4) Row (3)/(2) (1.71 0.87 1.04 1.07 0.98 0.98 0.87 1.65 
(5) Cum. Number 874 1656 2197 2566 2789 3345 3517 4040 
(6) Cum. % of Total 21,63 40.99 54.38 63.51 69.03 82.79 87.05 100.00 
(7) Cum. % of Assets 15 ,31 32.23 46.19 55.99 61.39 74.88 78.58 100.00 
( 1 )  Number 1660 1187 547 
(2) % of Total 41.09 29.38 13.54 
(3) % of Assets 33.51 30.01 13.56 
3.0% (4) Row (3)/(2) 0.82 1.02 1.00 
(5) Cum. Number 1660 2047 3394 
(6) Cum. % of Total 41.09 70.47 84.01 
(7) Cum. % of Assets 33.51 63.52 77.08 
(1) Number Z437 1115 332 
(2) % of Total 60,32 27.60 8.22 
(3) % of Assets 5/ ,16 28.38 11.73 
4.0% (4) Row (3)/(2) 0„ 90 1.03 1.43 
(5) Cum, Number ::437 3552 3084 
(6) Cum. % of TcDt£ll 6(L32 87.92 96.14 
(7) Cuir. % of Assets 54,16 82.54 94.27 
= Cumula1:ivo. 
254 
6.29 
7.40 
1 .10  
3648 
90.30 
84.48 
86 
2.13 
2.58 
1.21 
3970 
98.27 
96. 85 
137 
3.39 
4.75 
1.40 
3785 
93.69 
89.22 
30 
0.74 
1.02 
1.38 
4000 
99.01 
97.86 
168 
4.16 
6.36 
1.53 
3953 
97.85 
95.58 
16 
0.40 
1.78 
4.45 
4016 
99.41 
99.65 
25 
0.62 
1.75 
2 . 8 2  
3978 
98.47 
97.33 
6 
0.]5 
0.12 
0 . 8 0  
4022 
99.55 
99.76 
6 2  
1.53 
2.66 
1.74 
4040 
100.00 
100.00 
18 
0.45 
0.24 
0.53 
4040 
100.00 
100.00 
Tal)] G 8. Capacity of in.sur«l savincf.s and loan associations to pay higher rates of return to 
depositors out of current net before-tax income plus accumulated retained earnings 
and bad-debt reserves. Jur e; 30, 1979. 
Increase Number of Years the Individual Associations Can Last (y); 
in Rate of 
Keturn (R) 0 < y < 1 1 < Y < 2 2 < Y < 3 3 < Y < 4 4 < Y < 5  5  < Y <  1 0  10 < Y :S 15 Y> 15 
(1) Num))er 100 42 37 45 63 293 228 3232 
(2) % of Total %.48 1.04 0.92 1.11 1.56 7.25 5.64 80.00 
(3) % of Assets 0,45 0.17 0.45 0,51 1.73 5.61 3.98 87.12 
R = 1,0% (4) Row (3)/(2) 0„18 0,16 0.49 0.46 1.11 0.77 0.71 1.09 
(5) Cum/^ Number 100 142 179 224 287 580 808 4040 
(6) Cum, % of Total 2.48 3.51 4.43 5..54 7.10 14.36 20.00 100.00 
(7) Cum. % of Assets 0.45 0.61 1.06 1.57 3.30 8.91 12.88 100.00 
(1) Number 167 142 250 384 378 1279 478 962 
(2) % of Total '1.13 3.51 6.19 9.50 9.36 31.66 11.83 23.81 
(3) % of Assets 0.66 1.44 4.91 8.68 7.36 32.28 12.30 32.37 
(4) Row (3)/(2) 0.16 0.41 0.79 0.91 0.79 1.02 1.04 1.36 
(5) Cum. Number 167 309 559 943 1321 2600 30/8 4040 
(6) Cum . % of Total '1,13 7.65 13.84 23,34 32.70 64.36 76.19 100.00 
(7) Gum. % of: Assets 0.66 2.11 7.01 15 .69 23.05 55.33 67.63 100.00 
(1) Number 258 495 943 
(2) % of Total 6.39 12.25 23.34 
(3) % of Assets 1.25 9.58 22.48 
3.0% (4) Row (3)/(2) 0.20 0.78 0.96 
(5) Cum. Number 258 753 1696 
(6) Cu:ti, , % of Total 6.39 18.64 41.98 
(7) Cum. % of Assets 1.25 10.83 33.32 
(1) Number 3 90 1318 1241 
(2) % of Total 9.65 32.62 30.72 
(3) % of Assets 2.62 31.70 31.69 
4.0% (4) Row (3)/(2) 0.27 0.97 1.03 
(5) Cum. Number 390 1708 2949 
(6) Cum, % of Total 9.65 42.28 73.00 
(7) Cum. % of Assets 2.62 34.32 66.02 
Cum. Cumulative. 
802 
19.85 
21.76 
1 . 1 0  
2498 
61.83 
55.07 
560 
13.86 
15.91 
1.15 
3509 
86. 86 
81.93 
507 
12.55 
11.31 
0.90 
3005 
74.38 
66.38 
280 
6.93 
10.98 
1.58 
3789 
93.79 
92.91 
790 
19.55 
23.12 
1 . 1 8  
3795 
93.94 
89.50 
212 
5.25 
6.50 
1.24 
4001 
99.03 
99.41 
120 
2.97 
5.14 
1.73 
3915 
96.91 
94.64 
13 
0.32 
0.23 
0.72 
4014 
99.36 
99.63 
125 
3.09 
5.36 
1.73 
4040 
100.00 
100.00 
26 
0.64 
0.36 
0.56 
4040 
100.00 
100.00 
Table 9. Capacity of j.nsurcd savinijs and loan associations to pay higher rates of return to 
depositors out of current net before-tax income plus accumulated retained earnings, 
bad-debt reserves, and stock, June 30, 1979. 
Number of Years the Individual Associations Can Last (Y); 
0  <  Y  <  1  1 < Y < 2  2 < Y < 3  3 < Y < 4  4 <  Y < 5  5 < Y < 1 0  1 0 < Y < 1 5  Y  > 1 5  
(1) Number 49 23 28 45 52 289 253 3301 
(2) % of Total 1.21 0.57 0.69 1.11 1.29 7.15 6.26 81.71 
(3) % of Assets 0.25 0.14 0.37 0.52 1.65 5.49 3.96 87.63 
(4) Wow (3)/(2) 0.21 0.25 0.54 0.47 1.28 0.77 0.63 1.07 
(5) Cum.""^ Number 49 72 100 145 197 486 739 4040 
(6) Ci;m. % of Total 1.21 1.78 2.48 3.59 4.88 12.03 18.29 100.00 
(7) Cum. % of Assets 1X25 0.39 0.76 1.28 2.93 8.41 12.37 100.00 
Increase 
in Hate of 
Return (R) 
(1) Number 75 91 222 391 396 1338 499 1028 
(2) % of Total 1.86 2.25 5.50 9.68 9.80 33.12 12.35 25.45 
(3) % of Assets 0.38 1.00 4.42 8.56 7.88 32.60 11.48 33.67 
(4) Row (3)/(2) 0.20 0.44 0.80 0.88 0.80 0.98 0.93 1.32 
(5) Cum. Number 75 166 388 779 1175 2513 3012 4040 
(6) Cum, , % of Total 1.86 4.11 9.60 19.28 29.08 62.20 74.55 100.00 
(7) Cum. % of Assets 0.38 1.38 5.80 14.36 22.25 54.85 66.33 100.00 
(1) Number no 425 978 
(2) % of Total 2.72 10.52 24.21 
(3) % of Assets C.53 8.57 22.69 
(4) Row (3)/(2) C.19 0.81 0.94 
(5) Cum. Number 110 535 1513 
(6) Cu n . % of Total 2.72 13.24 37.45 
(7) Cum. % of Assets C .53 9.11 31.79 
(1) Number 203 1297 1316 
(2) % of Total 5.02 32.10 32.57 
(3) % of Assets 2 .47 30.16 33.06 
(4) Row (3)/(2) C.29 0.94 1.02 
(5) Cum. Number 203 1500 2816 
(6) Cum, , % of Total E , 02 37.13 69.70 
(7) Cum. % of Assets ] .47 31.68 64.69 
Cum. = Cumulative. 
843 540 846 147 151 
20.87 13.37 20.94 3.64 3.74 
21.16 12.09 23.65 5.29 6.02 
1.01 0.90 1.13 1.45 1.61 
2356 2896 3742 3889 4040 
5 8,32 71.68 92.62 96.26 100.00 
52.96 65.04 88.69 93.98 100.00 
593 302 260 24 45 
14.68 7.48 6.44 0.59 1.11 
15.61 11.76 7.29 0.27 0.37 
1.06 1.57 1.13 0.46 0.33 
3409 3711 3971 3995 4040 
84.38 91.86 98.29 98.89 100.00 
80.29 92.06 99.36 99.63 100.00 
Tab] c J O. Capacity of insurecl savirujs and loan associations to pay higher rates of return to 
depositors out of current, net before-tax income plus accumulated retained earnings, 
December 31, 1979. 
Increase 
1: ii 
of Years the Individual Associations Can Last (y): 
in Rate of 
Keturn (R) 0 < y < 1 1 < Y < 2  2 < Y < 3 3 < y < 4  4 < Y< 5 5 < Y < 1 0  10 <Y < 15 Y> 15 
(1) Numbcir 402 220 173 166 125 333 151 2468 
(2) % of Total (L96 5.45 4.28 4.11 3.10 8.25 3.74 61.12 
(3) % of Assets E ,.83 5.05 3.73 3.79 2.40 7.54 3.57 68.10 
R - 1.0% (4) Row (3)/(2) (I.SÇ) 0.93 0.87 0.92 0.77 0.91 0.95 1.11 
(5) Cum.^ Number 402 622 795 961 1086 1419 1570 4038 
(6) Cum „ % of Total (',,96 15.40 19.69 23.80 26.89 35.14 38.88 100.00 
(7) Cuif. % of Assets ;„83 10.89 14.61 18.40 20.80 28.34 31.91 100.00 
(1) Number 971 759 542 356 247 460 142 561 
(2) % of Total 2<.05 10.80 13.42 8.82 6.12 11.39 3.52 13.89 
(3) % of Assets 17 „93 18.89 13.21 7.50 5.69 11.13 3.62 22.03 
Û = 2.0% (4) How (3)/(2) (1,75 1.00 0.90 0.85 0.93 0.98 1.03 1.59 
(5) Cum. Numljer 971 1730 2272 2628 2875 3335 3477 4038 
(6) Cum „ % of Total 2/.05 42.84 56.27 65.08 71.20 82.59 06.11 100.00 
(7) Cuifi. % of Assets 17.93 36.82 50.03 57.53 63.22 74.36 77.98 100.00 
(1) Number ]710 1149 534 
(2) % of Total 4: .,35 28.45 13.22 
(3) % of Assets 3('„32 27.61 13.39 
(4) Row (3)/(2) 0,86 0.97 1.01 
(5) Cum. Number ] 710 2859 3393 
(6) Cum, . % of Total 42 „35 70.80 84.03 
(7) Cuir. % of Assets 36.32 63.94 77.33 
(1) Number 2477 1059 297 
(2) % of Total 61.34 26.23 7.36 
(3) % of Assets 5/1 .,71 26,41 12.22 
(4) Row (3)/(2) 0.89 1.01 1.66 
(5) Cum, Number 2477 3536 3833 
(6) Cum. % of Total 61,34 87.57 94.92 
(7) Cuir,. % of Assets 54.71 81.12 93.34 
= Cumulative. 
204 
5.05 
4.74 
0.94 
3595 
89.08 
82.07 
91 
2.25 
1 . 0 6  
0.47 
3924 
97.18 
9440 
138 
3.42 
5.51 
1.61  
3735 
92.50 
87.58 
36 
0.89 
1.61  
1.81 
3936 
98.07 
96.01 
160 
3.96 
6.07 
1.53 
3895 
96.46 
93.65 
40 
0.99 
3.62 
3.66 
4000 
99.06 
99.63 
36 
0.89 
0.91 
1.02 
3931 
97.35 
94.55 
4 
0.10 
0.04 
0.40 
4004 
99.16 
99.67 
107 
2.65 
5.45 
2.06 
4038 
100.00 
100.00 
34 
0.84 
0.33 
0.39 
4038 
100.00 
100.00 
Tab.Uî 11. Capacit.y of: Insured savings and loan associations to pay higher rates of return to 
depositors out of curren ; net before-tax Income plus accumulated retained earnings 
and bad-<3ebt reserves, December 31, 1979. 
Inc)ease Number of Years the Individual Associations Can Last (Y)i 
jn Hato of 
Return (R) 0 < Y < 1 1 < Y < 2 2 < Y < 3 3 < Y < 4 4 < Y < 5 5 < Y < 10 10 < Y < 15 Y>15 
(] ) Number 89 54 48 49 73 375 294 3066 
(2) % of Tota1 20 1.34 1.19 1.21 1.81 9.29 7.03 75.93 
(3) % ol: Assets 0. 23 0.41 1.12 1.17 1.76 7.49 5.79 82.03 
(4) Row (3)/(2) 0. 10 0.31 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.81 0.82 1.08 
(5) Cum.'^ Number 89 143 191 240 313 688 972 4038 
(6) Cum. % of Total 2. 20 3.54 4.73 5.94 7.75 17.04 24.07 100.00 
(7) Cum. % of Assets 3. 23 0.64 1.76 2.93 4.69 12.18 17.97 100.00 
(1) Number' 160 138 260 421 420 1233 448 958 
(2) % of Total 3.96 3.42 6.44 10.43 10.40 30.53 11.09 23.72 
(3) % of Assets D.76 2.23 5.39 8.91 10.58 30.21 9.33 32.60 
(4) Row (3)/(2) ].19 0.65 0.84 0.85 1.02 0.99 0.84 1.37 
(5) Cum. Number' 160 298 558 979 1399 2632 3080 4038 
(6) Cum . % of Total 3.96 7.38 13.82 24.24 34.65 65.18 76.28 100.00 
(7) Cum. % of Assets 0.76 2.99 8.38 17.29 27.87 58.07 67.41 100.00 
(1) Number :!49 402 958 
(2) % of Total e .17 11.94 23.72 
(3) % of Assets ] .27 10.00 24.14 
(4) Row (3)/(2) C. 21 0.84 1.02 
(5) Cum. Number :W9 730 1689 
(6) Cum. , % of Total e. 17 18.10 41.03 
(7) Cum. % of Assets ] . 27 11.35 35.49 
(1) Number 360 1284 1256 
(2) % of Total 9,11 31.80 31.10 
(3) % of Assets 2.06 30.75 30.89 
(4) Row (3)/(2) 34 0.97 0.99 
(3) Cum. Number 36n 1652 2908 
(6) Cum. % of Total 9, 11 40.91 72.02 
(7) Cum. % of Assets „ 06 33.81 64.70 
= Cumulat'.ive. 
806 504 743 120 176 
19.96 12.40 10.40 2.97 4.36 
19.26 11.34 20.89 4.91 8.12 
0.96 0.91 1.14 1.65 1.86 
2495 2999 3742 3862 4038 
61.79 74.27 92.67 95.64 100.00 
54.76 66.09 06.98 91.89 100.00 
564 256 241 21 48 
13.97 6.34 5.97 0.52 1.19 
14.65 8.94 10.66 0.31 0.74 
1.05 1.41 1.79 0.60 0.62 
3472 3728 3969 3990 4038 
85.98 92.32 98.29 98.81 100,00 
79.35 88.29 98.95 99.26 100.00 
Table 12. Capacity of insured saviigs and loan associations to pay higher rates of return to 
doposit.ors out of curreiiL net before-tax income plus accumulated retained earnings, 
ted-debt reserves, and stock, December 31, 1979. 
Number of Years the Individual Associations Can Last (Y); 
0 <  Y < 1  1  <  Y  5  2  2 < Y < 3  3 < Y < 4  4 < Y < 5  5 < Y < 1 0  1 0 < Y < 1 5  Y > 1 5  
(1) Number 35 35 45 44 64 400 291 3124 
(2) % of Total ] .07 0 .87 1.11 1.09 1.58 9.91 7.21 77.37 
(3) % of Assets J .11 0 .32 0.98 1.17 1.64 7.51 5.56 82,60 
1.0% (4) Row (3)/(2) 3 .13 0 .37 0.88 1.07 1.04 0.76 0.79 1.07 
(5) Cum.'^ Number 35 70 115 159 223 623 914 4038 
(6) Cum. % of TotaJ. 1 .87 ]. .73 2.85 3.94 5.52 15.43 22.63 100.00 
(7) Cun. % of Assets 0 .11 0 .43 1.41 2.59 4.23 11.74 17.40 100.00 
Inci'ease 
j.n Kate of 
Return (R) 
(1) Number 74 97 245 413 442 1286 477 1004 
(2) % of Total 1.83 2.40 6.07 10.23 10.95 31.85 11.81 24.86 
(3) % ol; Assets 0.38 1.96 4.97 8.72 10.17 30.67 9.83 33.32 
(4) Row (3)/(2) 0.21 0.82 0.82 0.85 0.93 0.96 0.83 1.34 
(5) Cum. Number 74 171 416 829 1271 2557 3034 4038 
((') Cum . % of Total 1.83 4.23 10.30 20.53 31.48 63.32 75.14 100.00 
(7) Cum. % of Assets 0,38 2.34 7.30 16.02 26.19 56.86 66.69 100.00 
(1) Nuinbcîr 118 424 979 
(2) % of Total 2.92 10.50 24.24 
(3) % of As.set:s 0,61 8.88 23.92 
3.0% (4) Row (3)/(2) 0.21 0.85 0.99 
(5) Cum. Number 118 542 1521 
(6) Cum. , % of Total 2.92 13.42 37.67 
(7) Cuir. % of Assets 0,61 9.49 33.41 
(1) Number 200 1253 1329 
(2) % of Total 4 9 5  31.03 32.91 
(3) % of Assets : , 96 29.48 31.88 
4.0% (4) How (3)/(2) 0.40 0.95 0.97 
(5) Cum, Number 200 1453 2782 
(6) Gum. % of Total 4.95 35.98 68.90 
(7) Curn. % of Assets j., 96 31.44 63.32 
^Cum. ~ Cumulative. 
840 
20.80 
19,22 
0.92 
2361 
58.47 
52.63 
588 
14.56 
15.53 
1.07 
3370 
83.46 
78.85 
531 
13.15 
12.30 
0.94 
2892 
71.62 
64.93 
285 
7 . 0 6  
8.90 
1 . 2 6  
3655 
90.52 
87.75 
001 
19.84 
21.68 
1.09 
3693 
91.46 
86 .61  
282 
6.98 
10.82 
1.55 
3937 
97.50 
98.57 
149 
3.69 
5.23 
1.42 
3842 
95.15 
91.84 
:ii 
0.77 
0.59 
0.77 
3968 
98.27 
99.16 
196 
4.85 
8.17 
1.68 
4038 
100.00 
100.00 
70 
1.73 
0.84 
0.49 
4038 
100.00 
100.00 
47 
table 8 and 11 comparisons show an improvement for some associations but 
the overall results of these tables tend to uphold the general trend of 
poorer financial conditions. The comments relevent to the results 
also hold true for a comparison of the RES^ results (tables 6, 9, and 12). 
The results listed in tables 4 through 12 also indicate that the 
weakest associations tend to be smaller than average in terms of total 
assets. An examination of the associations that fall into the 0 < Y < 1 
time category reveals a percent-of-assets-to-percent-of-total ratio 
(row 4) which, in some cases, is as small as 0.10. 
Problems with Results 
There are several factors which cause the results to both over­
state and understate the problem being measured. First, the average 
return on mortgages held by S&Ls has been increasing over time as 
current mortgage rates continue to be higher than the average return on 
mortgages held by SSLs. Since the above scenarios assume that the 
dvcidyc: iduc ui. icuuiii UJ- uycy ca wj._L-L COiiS L OVôîT ÛÙ-ITi^, 
t . T ' î l ' î  V s  O  T . 7 / - W -  ^  4 -  ^  V »  T . T y - M  1  1  3  C  d  V  4  / " T  4  
assumptions. The data in table 13 show that the average return on 
mortgages at SSLs has increased an average of approximately 25 basis 
points per year since 1972, This table also illustrates several other 
problems facing the S&L industry. Whereas the average cost of funds 
Vs-N<— V» fx 4— /-» o 4 ^ o C w»! i /—i V-> TVI v O ^ 4 1 r / T» v\v-\ v- n O ^ O T ^ f A c* V ^ ^ .i. Cfc y V Cfc «_> ^ 
26 basis points per year since 1972} rhan che average recurn on 
mortgages, it has exhibited a greater deal of volatility. An 
Table 13, Average inl'.ore.st rciturn on mortgages held and average interest cost of funds of 
insured savings and loan associations, 1972 through the first half of 1979.& 
Half Year 
1972 HI 
H2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Average Interest Change in Average Interest Change in 
Heturn on Mortgages Column (1) (From Cost of Funds Column (3) (From Column (1) 
(Percent) Previous Period) (Percent) Previous Period) Minus (3) 
6.93 
7 .02 0 .09 
5 .39 
5 .42 0 .03 
1.54 
1.60 
1973 HI 
112 
7.10 
7.23 
0.08 
0.13 
5.46 
5.72 
0.04 
0 . 2 6  
1.64 
1.51 
1974 HI 
H2 
7 .35 
7.51 
0.12 
0 . 1 6  
6 .00  
F.2G 
0.28  
0.28 
1.35 
1.23 
1975 HI 
112 
7.59 
7 .74 
0.08 
0.15 
6.31 
6.34 
0.03 
0.03 
1 . 2 8  
1.40 
1976 HI 
112 
7.07 
8 .03 
0.13 
0.16  
6.35 
6.40 
0.01 
0.05 
1.52 
1.63 
1977 HI 
H 2 
0.14 
8.20  
0.11 
0.14 
6.39 
6 .48 
- 0 . 0 1  
0.09 
1.75 
1 . 8 0  
1970 HI 
H2 
8.39 
8 .54 
0.11 
0.15 
6.54 
6.79 
0.06  
0.25 
1.85 
1 .66  
1979 HI 8.70 0.16 7.23 0.44 1.47 
^Source; "Nonbank Thrift Institutions in 1977 and 1978" [2, page 932] and "Statistical 
Series" [27, pages 35-36]. 
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examination of columns (2) and (4) makes this point clear. Also, 
column (5) indicates that the interest rate spread between the cost of 
funds and return on assets for the SSLs has been decreasing since the 
first half of 1978. 
Also serving to overstate the problem is the fact that (as 
discussed earlier in this paper) with interest rate ceilings on deposits, 
the individual SSLs may be less cost conscious than otherwise. This 
implies that expenses are larger and, therefore, net income is 
smaller for each association . It could be that, if deposit rates rose, 
the endangered associations would scramble to become more efficient and 
would be in less danger of becoming insolvent. 
Also, as mentioned before, is the problem that MMCs are not 
exculded from total savings deposits when conducting the experiments. 
If one agrees that MMCs earn a market rate of return their exclusion 
would make SC in equation 2 smaller and, hence, Y would be larger. 
On a more recent note, various events have served to make it easier 
for S&Ls to survive their current problems. Prepayment penalty income 
for the first quarter of 1980 am.ounted to $694 million and special 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board dividends for the second quarter of 1980 
are expected to add an extra $200 to $250 million to the industry 
return on its stock and has increased the frequency of these dividend 
payments (from yearly to quarterly). The Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
has also set up an emergency advance plan where certain S&Ls can 
receive funds at one-half a percent below the normal advance rate. 
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There is also some indication that S&Ls have reduced their staffs by-
attrition in an effort to combat the current earnings squeeze 118, 
page 3]. 
In summary, the results listed in this section tend to indicate 
that the SSL industry would have a difficult time if deposit rate 
ceilings were lifted and the rates that S&Ls would be forced to pay 
increased substantially. A one or two percent increase in deposit 
rates would quickly place a large number of S&Ls in a poor financial 
position. The capacity of S&Ls to pay a higher deposit rate is 
increased substantially if they are allowed to dip into their bad-debt 
reserves; however, this is not allowed under current regulations and, 
in itself, may not be a desirable option. 
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ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES FOR S&Ls 
What could be done to change the structure of the S&Ls so that 
they would be able to compete in an atmosphere of no rate ceilings? The 
problem of the SSLs results from a mismatch of the maturities of their 
assets and liabilities; hence, solutions have centered on either 
lengthening the maturities of their liabilities or providing their assets 
with a more variable return. 
Lengthening Liability Maturity 
The former proposition listed above would involve having SSLs hold 
a larger percentage of their liabilities in long-term time deposits (in 
conjunction with high penalties for early withdrawal). With a relatively 
small percentage of deposits subject to immediate withdrawal, the SSLs 
would be more sheltered from the threat of competition with both CBs 
and the open market. When interest rates rise, the S&L could increase 
the rate it pays on all types of deposits but this would not mean an 
imm.ediate increase in the rate paid zo all depositors. The S&L would 
nor have ro pay a higher rate on its old time accounts (at least not 
until they reached maturity), but only on its savings deposits and the 
new time accounts acquired. 
However, this type of plan mpy create several undesirable problems. 
Firsc, a maturity structure consisting only of long-term time deposits 
(say, 6-8 years) may be undesirable in that it may discourage deposits 
from savers who desired more liquidity. Such a rigid structure may 
result in a shift of deposits from the SSLs into other financial 
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institutions as the savers attempted to maintain their desired liquidity-
position. This would obviously place the S&Ls at a competitive 
disadvantage relative to other financial institutions. A maturity 
structure which would offer the desired liquidity to the small saver 
may not be sufficient to offer the S&Ls adequate protection against 
interest rate changes. 
Variable Return Assets 
The alternative to lengthening the maturities of liabilities would 
be to provide the S&Ls with assets which offer a more flexible return. 
This can be done by either shifting to some type of variable rate loan 
or by keeping the fixed rate loan but making the assets of a more 
short-term nature. 
Short-term assets 
The latter suggestion involves making S&Ls somewhat like CBs with 
respect to the types of assets they hold (for example, allowing S&Ls to 
tive loans would necessarily imply a shift out of home mortgages which 
would cause probleiris for the housing industry. Surely some of the 
resulting slack would be taken up by CBs and other sources of mortgage 
credit; however^ the net result would probably be a reduction in the 
amount of funds available to the housing market than would be the case 
with specialized S&Ls. 
Variable-rate loans 
' i ' V ^ V* Vv ^ n 1 V » -i— ^ U— •• # ~ ^ ^  ^ •*. n ^ -k X- ^ ^ — w A ^ « . f* — — T-v — 
• —' —  ^ •— S.. W  ^J 2^  ^  w .h. C* C, C ^ V ^*7^ X X id • CL V 1 O •• 
race mortgages (VR.M), a variable-maturity mortgage (VMM), and a 
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rollover mortgage (ROM). 
The VRM is a fixed-maturity mortgage whose rate varies in some 
fixed relationship with either an open market rate (called a reference 
rate) or with some cost of funds index. The result is that monthly-
payments vary as the rate applied to the mortgage changes. As a 
consumer protection measure, the frequency and the allowable amount of 
change in the rate may be regulated by law. 
Use of XTRMs would certainly provide S&Ls with greater flexibility 
and might even allow them to operate and compete effectively with 
CBs in the absence of deposit rate controls. It should be noted, 
however, that the simple introduction of a VRM instrument is no 
guarantee that S&Ls will be able to operate without controls. First, 
one must consider the time lag between the introduction of VRMs and 
their general acceptance. The movement from a portfolio of 100 percent 
fixed-rate mortgages to that of VRMs takes some time. During this 
interval one can only expect a gradual improvement in the competitive 
position of the S&Ls. 
^ ^  ^ ^  "v- ^ ^ ^  ^ ^ ^ /-s ^ T / i_) ^ ^ /-V, ^ —, V" C C". T 1.1 CX u. u. v_/i 1 L.À C LA C ^ V.AC^ ^ v_ w ' Ci 
portfolios would equilibrate at a point of 100 percent VRMs. It might 
be the case that, because of consumer resistance, only 50 percent of 
SiiL portfolios v.'ould be . Obviously Lhe siTiiller the percentage of 
their portfolios in VRMs. the more vulnerable the S&Ls would be toward 
abrupt interest rate increases. 
However, even a 100 percent VRM portfolio is no guarantee that the 
S&Ls will be able to function without deposit rate ceilings. First. 
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the reference rate or the index to which the VRM interest rate is tied 
may not be responsive enough to allow for the needed changes. For 
example, suppose that the reference rate is some long-term federal 
government bond rate. When interest rates are quickly increasing, it 
is the short-term rates that exhibit the most volitility. It could be 
that the return on banking assets would become very high while the 
reference rate remained relatively low. Beyond these reference rate 
problems are the consumer protection provisions that tend to be incorpo­
rated into VRM contracts. These are provisions with respect to the 
frequency and size of possible rate increases. It is easy to foresee 
the case where the protection provisions would be restrictive enough 
to negate a significant portion of the benefit of VRMs. 
To summarize, the VRMs at least have the potential of allowing 
S&Ls to function without deposit rate controls. The important point 
to note here deals with who is to bear the risk of the interest rate 
changes. Under the current fixed-rate system these risks are shouldered 
entirely by the S&Ls with no interest rate risk placed upon the borrower 
of funds. The exclusive use of VRMs, where the reference rate is tied 
to the prevailing mortgage rate and the rate applied to VRMs is changed 
frequently, would shift almost all of the burden of rate change onto 
tine borrower. Tnis vrouici niost: iiJ-cely anew tor tne suspension cr rate 
ceilings: however ; this situation may not be the most desirable as the 
burden placed upon the borrower may be too hea\-y« The optimal solution 
may be a situation where the burden of interest rate increases is split 
between the borrower and the S&L. This solution mav necessitate the 
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occasional imposition of deposit rate controls, however, it may be 
the most desirable. 
This begs the question of whether or not deposit rate controls will 
work in the future. In the earlier years of deposit rate controls 
there were few alternatives for savers who customarily used the financial 
institutions as a savings outlet and even some of these alternatives 
were eliminated by the federal authorities (such as the increase in the 
minimum, denomination of Treasury bills from $1,000 to $10,000 in March 
1970). However, as time has passed, (1) savers have become more 
sophisticated and more willing to enter the open market: and (2) more 
alternatives have gradually developed for the saver (as one would expect 
in a market economy). These events have forced the government regulators 
to allow higher cost deposits at financial institutions (MI>ICs, etc.) 
which has recently put the S&Ls in a severe earnings squeeze. 
As time passes, the system tends to adjust and creates institutions 
and structures which serve to make rate controls less and less workable. 
Indeed, the high interest rates of late 1979 and early 1980 created a 
sufficient crisis to induce federal legislation to phase out these 
deposit rate controls. It is at least rhe perception of Congress that 
these ceilings are no longer workable (or desirable). 
If these controls are no longer workable today, will they be 
workable in the future? If the current institutions and structures 
which have been created to circumvent the deposit ceilings remain, then 
the answer to this question is no. However, if these institutions and 
structures disappear with the rate ceilings (for example, suppose without 
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deposit rate ceilings, money market mutual funds cease to offer a 
relevant service to the public and they fall from existence), then the 
answer may be yes. Under these conditions, the brief imposition of 
rate ceilings may be a viable alternative. The interpretation of "brief" 
being a time period too short to allow the redevelopment of the above 
mentioned institutions. 
The VMM is a mortgage instrument with f ixed monthly payments, an 
interest rate which may vary (in the sairie fashion as a VRM), and a 
maturity which is flexible. It is the maturity which will increase or 
decrease in response to reference rate changes. 
The use of VMMs may also allow S&Ls to earn a market rate of 
return on its assets but it does not have the added advantage of 
providing for an increased flow of funds into the S&L when rates increase. 
It should be pointed out, however, that a sufficiently large increase 
in the mortgage rate could couse the maturity to go to infinity (or to 
seme specified maximum,, say, 40 years). In this case, the monthly 
payments would not be sufficient to cover the interest charge and a 
negative amortization would result. 
The third type of variable-rate loan is the ROM. The ROM is a 
loan such that the terms of the contract are renegotiated periodically 
(typically, every 3-5 years}. The applicable rate ma.y be some 
V -i- o 1 /-*o "»• 
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Typically, it is expected that the loan will be renegotiated at the 
prevailing interest rate. 
Both the VMM and the ROM have the potential of allowing S&Ls to 
operate without deposit rate controls; however, as with the VRM, their 
introduction is no guarantee that rate controls will not have to be 
periodically reimposed. As a final note, one could develop hybrid 
types of mortgages that, for example, included characteristics of both 
the VRM and the VT-M. 
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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 
The recent rapid increase in market interest rates has created a 
severe earnings squeeze for the S&L industry. The popular acceptance of 
the MMC (34.7 percent of total S&L savings deposits in March 1980) 
has proven to be very costly to SSLs both in terms of dollar expense and 
in the reduction of the average maturity of S&L liabilities. This 
rocky period has encouraged much legislation and many regulatory changes, 
some of which will be discussed below. 
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 
of 1980 was a step in the direction of making S&Ls and mutual savings 
banks more like CBs. This act authorizes NOW accounts (third-party 
transfers) for thrifts and also expands their loan and investment powers 
(thrifts may now grant consumer loans). But more importantly, this 
act provides for an orderly six year phase out of deposit rate ceilings 
at financial institutions. Recent federal legislation has suspended 
szate usury laws" and regulatory changes by the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board have allowed federally chartered S&Ls to offer both VRMs and ROMs. 
These changes provide for the removal of rate ceilings and they 
]_ 
The suspension of state usury laws is an important prerequisite 
to the introduction of VRMs and ROMs ^ S&Ls would be reluctant to 
oe negated by usury ceilings. 
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use of fixed-rate mortgages. Whether or not S&Ls will be in a position 
6 years from now to operate without rate ceilings is certainly a 
question to be considered. The VRM approved by the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board limits rate adjustments to one-half of a percentage point per 
year and also provides the additional consumer protection of a 2 1/2 
percentage point ceiling on the cumulative increase in the VRM interest 
rate. The ROM approved by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (called a 
renegotiable rate mortgage or RRM) provides for rate adjustments every 
3 to 5 years, a maximum rate increase of one-half of a percent per year, 
and a ceiling of a 5 percentage point rate increase over the life of the 
contract. These limitations serve to spread the interest rate risk 
between the borrower and the lender but they also serve to make it less 
likely that £&Ls will be able to function without rate ceilings. 
The rate at which these alternative mortgages instruments will be 
accepted is not exactly known; however, from exam.ination of the 
California SSL industry, Joseph McKenzie concluded that 
although aggressive California VRM marketeers have achieved half 
rhe nationwide equilibrium proportion of VRMs will be well 
below 50 percent. It also will take about 10 years Lo reach 
this level [20. page XV-15]. 
Another study by Smith, Kiest, and Field "estiir.ated that 52.8 percent 
of all current Ihome] owners are potential users of VRMs" 126, page 
V. CL* w— V OiiC W U 
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be built into the rom and vrm contracts. A prolonged period of low 
interest rates followed by an extended period of high rates may make 
the cumulative rate increase ceilings binding and place the SsL industry 
in the same position that it is today. 
This, however, may not be a totally undesirable situation. As 
mentioned previously, a spread of the interest rate risk among both the 
S&Ls and the borrower may necessitate the occasional imposition of 
deposit rate controls. 
A recent development in the mortgage market which may serve to 
stabilize the flow of funds into the housing sector is the more 
extensive use of mortgage-backed securities 124]. In 1978, $40 billion 
of mortgage-backed securities were issued; this represented almost 25 
percent of all home loan originations. These securities tap open 
market funds which tend to be a more stable source than has been the 
case of deposits at SsLs. It appears that, in the future, this 
development may serve to add stability to the mortgage credit market. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Interest rate ceilings on deposits at financial intermediaries 
create problems for some sectors of che economy. The housing marker 
tends to become more volatile, the small saver is denied a market 
determined return on his/her savings, and inefficiencies develop. 
Recently these problems have become severe enough to prompt 
legislation which calls for the gradual removal of these interest rate 
ceilings. However, as this study suggests, the current position of the 
S&L industry cannot safely allow for the removal of these ceilings 
without some change in the structure of the industry which would allow 
either for longer term liabilities or for assets with a more variable 
return. 
Recent regulatory changes now permit the use of mortgages which 
have a variable return; however, it is not clear that these new 
mortgage instruments will allow S&L associations to operate in the total 
absence of rare con-rols. Tne consumer prorecrion provisions of rhese 
1 O "!"• V" ^  TTRL  ^  ^ ".7 4  ^1 1  ^O V" 1 F T ,T -1 -I- V»  ^ V-> I 1 W, /-> V —. «-» Y—» TW —> «R » •» V» A O * <_« O «_* O * ^ «a •• —w L» ^ A IO ' ^ ' • T ' Cts., k<' A v i «_ 
SSLs froiTi ever holding an asset, portfolio which is flexable (with 
respect to interest rates) enough to allow them, to safely compete 
with both CBs and the open market; thus, even if rate controls are 
may be an occasional necessity. 
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Listed below are (1) the various variables used in Part I, (2) 
their location on the Federal Home Loan Bank Board semiannual report 
data tapes J and (3) their brief definitions, 
NI DATA BASE FIEID NAME; (D120) 
Total income minus total expenses of the association. 
T DATA BASE FIEID NAME: (ETIT) 
All Federal, State, or local income taxes or any other taxes 
based on income. 
SC DATA BASE FIEID NAMES: (BBRR + B103) 
Interest earning NOW accounts plus passbook and other accounts 
that earn at or below the regular rate plus accounts earning in 
excess of the regular rate with initial minimum deposit require­
ments of less than $100,000. 
RES^ DATA BASE FIELD NAMES: (C105 + C107) 
RES DATA BASE FIELD NAMES: (C105 4- C107 4- C1Q2 C103 + 
CI04 + C105) 
RES^ plus Federal insurance reserves plus reserves qualifying 
for Federal insurance reserves plus other general reserves plus 
other reserves. 
^ C104 + C105 -r ClOO -f ClOl) 
RES2 plus the par value of permanent j reserve^ and gijaranty 
stock plus any oaid-in or capital surplus. 
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PART II. ECONOMIES OF SIZE IN THE 
SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY 
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introduction 
The purpose of an economies of size^ study is to measure the long-
^ ^ cci 1 ill CLJ.iv^ u. L.O CI v c-i- ciy c: \_/_ycu-ci 
costs. Declining long-run average costs indicate economies of size and 
rising long-run average costs imply diseconomies of size. 
Economies of size are usually attributed to increased specializa­
tion of labor and to technological factors. As a firm increases in size 
it is better able to take advantage of specialization of labor. The 
small firm may have each worker performing several different tasks, 
whereas the large firm may have each employee performing only one task, 
thereby enabling the worker to become more efficient at that one task. 
Technological factors may also result in falling long-run average costs. 
For example, a computer that will handle 100,000 different accounts 
at a savings and loan association (S&L) may not be ten times as 
expensive as a computer that will handle 10,000 accounts; thus, the 
Idiuei r-LjLiu nidv be dble cu obtdlii d duvdritdyt;, 
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lower level employees become increasingly separated from cop manage­
ment, communication may become a problem and the result can be an 
T_ 
Strictly speaking, the phrase "economies of scale" m.ay be legit­
imately used only when a cost study assumes a hom.ogeneous production 
function. Since this study does not confine itself to the measurement 
of cost curves which are associated with homiogeneous production 
functions- the more general phrase "economies of size" will be used, 
instead. 
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increase in average operating costs. 
Reasons for this Study 
An economies of size study can be justified for three reasons. 
First, it can provide valuable information to S&L managers who should 
be interested in what would, on the average, happen to their operating 
costs if they did expand the size of their operations. From the stand­
point of the individual S&L, it may not be very apparent what the 
results of expanding their size of operation may be. What is needed 
is a study which takes a macro view. Second, government regulators 
Ci-h. O i da 1 -1.0- *11 a. I— u-ny L. * ^ y ) O 1 
as branching and merger restrictions, effect the size of the existing 
firms. Operating costs may not be of primary concern to the reg^jlators; 
however, if costs are significantly related to size of operation, they 
should be taken into consideration along with other factors such as 
competition, allocational efficiency, etc. 
hypothesis. Textbooks have traditionally assumed the presence of both 
economies and diseconomies of size; these notions based more on 
intuition than on actual empirical data. Empirical studies of this 
type can serve to either substantiate or refute these textbook claims. 
Theory 
Economic theory suggests that the short-run average cost (SRAC) 
curve for the firm will be "U" shaped. Different sized firms will have 
different "U" shaped SRAC curves and the envelope of these short-run 
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curves is defined as the long-run average cost (IRAC) curve (see 
figure 1). 
Unlike the short-run curves, economic theory itself has little to 
say about the shape of the LRAC curve. It has been suggested that it 
could be a straight horizontal line, a downward sloping curve, an 
upward sloping curve, or some combination of the three. The actual 
shape of a n^AC curve for any particular industry is something that 
must be determined by empirical results rather than something which 
is suggested by economic theory. 
Cross-sectional data on individual firms are really short-run 
data as all firms are always operating in a short-run time horizon. 
For this reason, the data collected are points which are scattered 
around the various SRAC curves and are not randomly scattered around 
the LRAC curve. Thus, using ordinary least squares, it is not empiri­
cally possible to measure a IRAC curve. What is actually measured is 
a curve such as the dashed line in figure 1 17, page 1010-1011] which 
might be called a "LRAC relationship" to distinguish it from the text­
book definition of a LRAC curve. This LRAC relationship is somewhat of 
a hybrid, containing both short-run and long-run elements. 
Firm Heterogeneity 
If all of the firms in the sample were homogeneous except for 
size, it would be possible to fit a cost relationship directly to the 
data. However, firms are not homogeneous and some adjustmients are 
necessary co avoid possible biases. For example, suppose a single 
sair.ple of S&Ls in a study includes firms from two different market 
Costs 
SI (AC 
Output 
Figure .1. The loiig-run average cosl: curve (LI^AC) and the meeisured long-run average cosl: 
relationship (dotted lino). 
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areas. One area is characterized by high labor costs, the other low 
labor costs. Furthermore, suppose the high-labor-cost market generally 
contains the larger S&Ls (as may be the case in larger urban centers). 
Under these circumstances the unadjusted data will tend to show higher 
costs for the larger associations, not because of reasons associated 
with size, but because of locational factors. In this case, simply 
regressing costs on output would resulc in a bias which would favor 
diseconomies of size. 
Thus, the test procedure needs to involve adjustments in the data to 
account for labor cost differences and any other differentials which 
are independent of the cost-output relationship itself. These adjust­
ments can be done by using one or both of the following techniques. 
First, cost adjustment variables may be included directly in the 
regression equation [12, page 31]. This would imply the following: 
Y = f(X^, X^, . . X^, Z^, Z^, . . ., Z^, u) (3) 
where Y is the cost variable, X is the output variable (typically X 
through X are zero, but they may be used to represent output squared, 
cubed, etc.), the Zs are the cost adjustment variables, and u is the 
disturbance term. 
i % ITZ J. i 1 o-L V.'i 1 KJi. J.** V. & IC X. ^  w A. O O U. L VZ-VJ i V U. 
for the cost differentials which are independent of the cost-output 
relationship itself. By doing this, the true cost-output relationship 
can be measured with the Xs. This technique has the advantage of 
measuring the cost-output relationship and simultaneously adjusting 
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for extraneous cost differentials. The coefficients of the Zs (provided 
they are significantly different from zero) may also provide useful 
information with respect to the cost structure of the S&L industry. 
For example, one cost adjustment variable may be a stock-mutual dummy 
intended to account for possible cost differences between stock and 
mutual associations. The coefficient of the variable may provide 
information as to which type association is, on the average, more 
expensive to operate. 
A second way to adjust the data is to construct subsamples, each 
of which contains as homogeneous a group of firms (except for size) as 
possible. This technique is not meant to be used in the absence of the 
method discussed above, but it can be used to greatly reduce the 
number of adjustment variables needed in the regression equation (but 
to the detriment of the number of usable observations). For example, 
som^e heterogeneity is due to the fact that firms operate in different 
market areas. A firm in New York City cannot be expected to face the 
same labor costs, building costs, property taxes, etc. as a firm of 
comparable size in Los Angeles. A sample which includes only New York 
City firms would not have to be adjusted for different market conditions. 
Major Questions 
It appears that, as with any economies of size study, there are 
four major questions that must be answered. These are: 
1) What cost variable should be used? 
2) What outDut variable should be usee? 
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4) What is the proper functional form? 
The format of the remainder of this paper will center around these 
four questions. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Three studies will be examined here. The first two, one by George 
J. Benston [4] and the other by Eugene F. Brigham and R. Richardson 
Pettit [7], appeared in the Study of the Savings and Loan Industry 
which was directed by Irwin Friend. The third article was written by 
Jay Atkinson [1] as an invited research paper for the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board (FKLBB). 
The Benston Study 
Benston did cross-sectional studies of 3,159 federally insured 
S&Ls for each of the years 1963 through 1966. The data were obtained 
from balance sheet and cost information provided to the FHLBB by its 
members and by those associations insured by the Federal Savings and 
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). The size of the associations (in 
terms of total assets) ranged from $300,000 to $500 million. 
iijie CwaC vcii.-Lciuj-g: 
Benston used total costs minus income received from renting office 
space to others, fees for services, state income taxes, advertising 
costs, and interest expenses [4- pages 681-85], The latter two costs 
were excluded because 
they are costs of acquiring customers or factors of 
production rather than costs of using factors of 
production. Also, these costs are determined primarily 
by market conditions (in both the markets for savings 
and loans) and, as such, are readily determinable from 
market data. Since differences in advertising and 
dividends do not reflect differences in the operating 
efficiency among associations directly, including them 
with operating costs would serve only to obscure the 
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relationship between operating costs and output and 
the other explanatory variables [4, page 689]. 
The output variable 
Benston used three different output variables in separate 
regressions. These were number of loans made per year, average number 
of loans serviced per month, and average number of savings accounts 
serviced per month. Total assets was rejected as a measure of output 
because it was thought that "mortgage lending costs are related to 
the number of loans made rather than to the dollar amount of loans" 
[4, page 587]. 
Cost adjustments 
Cost adjustments were made by including in the regression equation 
a federal-state charter dummy, a stock-mutual dummy, dummies to account 
for the age of the association, and dumm.ies to adjust for managerial 
differences. Also included were the number of offices, six output 
VPTT p n" W=>ct#=» pn-înQ-rTno-ni- tZ O 
measure the rate of change and the variability of output, and four 
variables that adjusted for risk differentials. 
Functional form 
v_ v*c2.o J-ii uirc: J-Vw'x u.»w^w J. Vy _L UliillJ-V 
form [4, page 698]. 
In C = In a + b In OP -r Z Cj_ In ODj_ 4- In U (4) 
C = operating costs 
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QP = the output variable 
QDj_ = cost adjustment variables 
U = the error term. 
This functional form was used because it is a cost function which 
is "based on a Cobb-Douglas production function" [4-, page 680]. 
Results 
In the functional form used above, a value of b equal to one would 
imply no economies of scale, b significantly less than one would imply 
economies of scale, and b significantly greater then one would imply 
diseconomies of scale. The value of b was found to be in the range of 
0.90 to 0.92, values which were significantly different from one (at the 
1% level). 
The Brigham-Pettit Study 
Brigham and Pettit (B-P) used data (from the FKLBB) from 1952 
through 1955 to do cross-sectional studies of three different market 
areas: Los Angeles-Long Beach, Chicago, and the Detroit-Cleveland area. 
The cost variable 
The total-cost-to-assets ratio was used to measure costs. 
Included in total costs were both advertising and interest expenses. 
It should be noted that, whereas, Benston fitted a total cost curve, 
B-P fitted an average cost curve. 
The output variable 
The dollar volume of assets was used to measure the size of rhe 
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institution because 
the level of assets appears to be the definition of 
output that most closely measures the relevant social 
product. It seems to us that a larger mortgage is more 
valuable to society than a smaller mortgage, and 
making $100,000 of savings available to borrowers 
would seem to be approximately 10 times as valuable to 
society as transmitting $10,000 of savings to the 
mortgage market [7, page 1002]. 
Cost adjustments 
Also included in the regression equation were variables which 
measured the number of branches, average deposit size, the fixed-asset-
to-total-asset ratio (to adjust for S&Ls that own substantial office 
buildings), the growth rate of the loan portfolio, the fee-income-to-
gross-income ratio (to adjust for interfirm differences in construction 
lending, sale of participations, and risk), the scheduled-items-to-
specified-assets ratio (designed to measure the risk of the loan 
portfolio), and a stock-mutual duuimy. 
? unct iona1 f orm 
The regression equations were of the following semilogarithmic 
form [7, page 1015]. 
Y = a -i- b In assets -i-Scj_X,;-i-u (5) 
where 
xs = 
u = 
cost-to-average-asser racio 
the cost adjustment variables 
the error term. 
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Results 
With the above functional form, a negative value of b (signifi­
cantly different from zero) would imply economies of scale and a 
positive value would indicate diseconomies. For all three of the 
market areas tested, b was significantly less than zero (at the 1% 
level). 
The Atkinson Study 
Atkinson used cross-sectional data which included 1,878 SsL 
associations; the size of which ranged from $1 million to about $1.2 
billion. Output and cost data on rhe S&Ls are from the December 1975 
FHLBB Semi-Annual Report. Data on bank deposits came from the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Call Reports on commercial banks and 
wage rate data came from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Area Wage 
Surveys. 
The cost variables 
Two total cost variables were tried: one which included both 
deposit interest expenses and total operating expenses, and another 
which included only operating expenses. The first cost variable was 
later rejected due to "severe dominant variable problems" [1, page 13]. 
^ ^ 1 /-> ^ ^ y— ^ ^ /~r /-SI -, 4- 4- 4- i ^ y 
 ^ O. J- *3 O W -L L. » U. I 1*3 O WI NII./0 L- V C.A U- V_ •rw V»* V* ^  A r » 
The output variable 
The output variable was the sum of the firm's earning assets. 
No discussion was civen as to the merits of this variable= 
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Cost adjustments 
The loans-serviced-by-others-to-total-assets ratio and the loans-
serviced -for -others-to-total-assets ratio were included in the 
regression equations to adjust for secondary market activity. Also 
included was the "bad"-loans-to-total-assets ratio to adjust for risk, 
the "other"-loans-to-total-assets ratio to adjust for asset heteroge­
neity, the borrowed-funds-to-total-funds ratio to adjust for higher 
costs that may accrue to firms which borrow, the interest-paid-on-
accounts-earning-at-or-below-the-passbook-rate-to-total-interest-
payments ratio to adjust for liability heterogeneity, a Herfindahl index 
which measured Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) savings 
deposit concentration (included were comparable deposits at commercial 
banks) to adjust for differing market conditions, a service-corporation-
investment-to-total-assets ratio to adjust for the extra costs of a 
service corporation, a Herfindahl index of the firms dispersion of 
deposits among its offices to adjust for the number of offices a firm 
has, a stock-mutual dummy, and a state-federal charter dummy. 
Functional form 
Atkinson fitted several different equations; they were all in a 
logarithmic form. The most general form fitted was [1. page 101 : 
In c = 3q + .S]_ In Q +32 (In Q)^ 4- g- In r -r 
34 In w ^5 (In r)^ - 2 35 (In r In w) -f 
2 a f 1 ^  / 1 1 v \ — s (  ^r> 1 \ -1. M / k — - - ^ A & » p./ 0 ^ ^ i i w -Ci i **/ * 
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11 
z bi+y avi + ^  (6) 
i=l 
where 
c = total operating costs (not including interest payments) 
0 = total assets 
r = average interest rate paid by the firm for deposits 
(to represent the price of capital) 
w = an index of wage costs for the SMSA in which the S&L 
is located (to represent the price of labor) 
AV^ = the ith adjustment variable 
{J. = the error term. 
This form is more flexible than the simple doublelogarithmic form 
used by Benston as it allows more flexibility with respect to the 
assumptions made about the underlying production function. Also, the 
2 inclusion of the (In 0) term allows the function to measure both 
economies and diseconomies and not just one or the other. The above 
cost function was fitted using a variety of differint constraints on 
the various coefficients. The first form fitted was a homogeneous cost 
function assum.ing unitary elasticities of substitution (^9 = 3^ = = 
3^ = 3g = 3g = 0), implying a basic Cobb-Douglas production function. 
The second form was a nomothetic cost function with unitary elasticities 
of si:bstitution (3_ = 3_ = 3_ = 3. = 3. = 0). the third was an 
unconstrained (Translog) cost function where all coefficients may take 
on any values, the fourth was a more general homothetic function -
Pg = 0), the fifth was a general homogeneous function (p^ = Pg = = 0), 
and the final form was an unconstrained (Translog) cost function with 
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the assumption of unit elasticities of substitution between inputs (3^ = 
^6 = 
In an effort to add more flexibility to the basic Cobb-Douglas cost 
function, Atkinson also fitted the following equation [1, page 30]: 
In c = + 3^ In Q + 32 In w + 3g In r + 
1^+3 ''"i ^  °i + A S 1^ 17 '°i 1" B) + (i (7) 
1=1 1 = 1 1=1 
wnere 
=1 if assets fall between $50 and $100 million 
D^ = 1 if assets fall between $100 and $200 million 
= 0 otherwise 
= 1 if assets are greater than $200 million 
- 0 otherwise. 
rhis intercept-slope dumm.y scheme enables the measurement of both 
of (1) being somewhat arbitrary with respect to its cutoff points and 
(2) oroducina a discontinuous averace cost function. 
•Hesuirs 
Wifh -i-hp Coob—fOTTH^ tCOStl ^Xss"bxci.t:y or S2.Z0 (3 ) 
ranged from 0.84 for a sample which included only unit associations to 
0.91 for a sample which included only branch associations. The 
coefficient of the (In 0)-^ term was significantly greater than zero 
(at the 1% level) in all of the ecuations where it was included. This 
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would indicate that the assumption of a constant cost elasticity of 
size may not be appropriate and the diseconomies of scale may be 
present. The intercept-slope scheme also supported these results. 
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METHODS 
This is a cross-sectional study using data provided by the FHLBB. 
These data include all federally insured SSLs. Balance sheet data are 
from June 30, 1979; income and expense data are from the first half 
of 1979. 
The Cost Variable 
The cost variable used in this study was total operating expenses 
(TOE). This variable does not include either interest payments on 
deposits or state and federal income tax payments. Interest payments 
were excluded because they are not directly related to the operating 
efficiency of the firm. What is of interest is how efficiently an 
institution can transfer funds from savers to borrowers and not the 
cost of funds themselves. Income tax payments were also excluded 
because they are not related to operating efficiency and their inclusion 
would result in a bias if tax rates are either progressive or regres­
sive . 
The Output Variable 
Since the function of a S&L is as a financial intermediary, the 
proper measure of output would be the quantity of intermediation it 
does per period of time. However, this information is not available so 
coral assets were used as a proxy. This is actually a measure of both 
current and past intermediation but it was felt that this was the best 
substitute variable available. 
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The Cost Adjustments 
Differing market conditions were adjusted for by dividing the data 
into samples of homogeneous market areas. The areas selected were 
Philadelphia, Chicago, New York City, and the Los Angeles-Long Beach 
area.^ The data were further adjusted by excluding from these samples 
associations which had obtained their insurance after 1970. New 
associations will (1) be saddled with "start up" costs in addition to 
their usual operating costs and (2) will typically be small associations. 
Their inclusion would tend to result in a bias toward economies of size. 
Table 14 lists the adjustment variables included in the individual 
regression equations. When a loan becomes delinquent the S&L must 
take some action above and beyond the normal servicing costs of a loan. 
Ultimately this may necessitate the foreclosure of the property which 
would create extra costs for the association. The real-estate-acquired-
to-total-assets ratio (RISK) is designed to measure the extra costs the 
association may incur due to bad debts. Real estate acquired consists 
of property which has been acquired by foreclosure, real estate in 
judgement, and repossessed mobile homes and chattels. The greater the 
This assumption of homogeneous market areas does not strictly 
hold. Included in each subsample were SSLs whose head office is 
located in the various cities. However, branches may be located in 
other geographical regions. This may introduce a bias in the results. 
For example, suppose the larger associations have branches in primarily 
rural areas, locations which may be associated with lower labor costs, 
building costs, etc. This would result in a bias toward economies of 
scale. This homogeneity assumption seems to be the most heavily 
violated in the Los Angeles sample, as California has traditionally 
had more liberal branching laws. 
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Table 14. Adjustment variables in the regression equation. 
Variable Description Adjusts for; 
RISK Real estate acquired 
Total assets 
Risk. 
DC = 1 for federal charter 
= 0 for state charter 
Charter differences, 
= 1 tor mutuaj. association 
= 0 for stock association 
urganizationai airrerences. 
AH Other loans 
Total loans 
Asset heterogeneity. 
Savings and NOW accounts 
Total savings 
Liability heterogeneity. 
BORR Borrowed money 
Total assets 
Borrowing. 
LSFOR j-'Oan servicing lees 
Total loans 
X 10,000 Mortgages sold. 
LS3Y Service fees on loans 
purchased Mortaaaes purchased. 
i'o-ai loans 
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quantity of bad debts the greater will be real estate acquired; hence, 
one would expect the sign of the RISK variable to be positive. 
DC and DT are both dummy variables which attempt to account for 
charter differences and organizational (stock-mutual) differences, 
respectively. Much has been written with respect to the different 
motivations of managers of both stock and mutual associations. It has 
traditionally been assumed that stock associations are more motivated 
by profit considerations due to their particular type of ownership. 
The managers of the stock associations must consider the needs of the 
stockholders whose interests rest, in part, with the size of future 
dividend payments. In contrast, the managers of mutual associations 
have been thought to be more responsive to the needs of the community 
and less interested in the pure goal of profit maximation. With these 
considerations, one could argue that stock associations should be more 
efficient than the mutuals and, thus, the expected sign of DT would be 
positive. Benston [4, page 593], however, disputes these claims and 
argues that there is more sirriilarity between the motivations of the 
managers of the two types of institutions, Based of interviews with 
S&L managers, Benston concluded that the salaries of the managers of 
mutual associations tended to be tied to the performance of the individ­
ual associations. If this is the case, there may be no difference 
in the performance of stock cr mutual managers. Under these assuiriptions, 
the expected value of the variable DT would be zero. 
Differenr. charters imply a different set of operating rules for 
che stare and federal associations which mav im.olv a difference in 
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operating costs. A priori, it is not possible to tell which type 
of charter may result in lower operating costs and it may even be the 
case that these factors will vary from, state to state. Different 
charters also imply a different number of government regulators. The 
state chartered associations in this sample are subjected to regulation 
from both state and federal authorities (federal regulation because of 
federal deposit insurance) and this might imply extra costs for the 
state associations. In conclusion, the expected value of DC is unknown 
and it may even vary from state to state. 
AH accounts for asset heterogeneity as other loans measures the 
nonmortgage loans of the association which may be more or less expensive 
to make relative to mortgage loans; thus, the expected sign of AH is 
unknown. LH adjusts for liability heterogeneity and is used because 
savings and NOW accounts are more expensive to handle than are time 
accounts. Savings and NOW accounts, given that these funds are (for 
practical purposes) subject to imjr.ediate withdrawal, experience mere 
activity (deposit and withdrawal) than is the case for time accounts. 
With time deposits, funds are usually kept on deposit for an extended 
period of tim^e and these accounts do not experience as much deposit and 
withdrawal activity as is the case with savings and NOW accounts. Thus, 
one would expect lower servicing costs for the tim.e accounts and, 
 ^ W ^  ate W ^  W Sw W <_& ^   ^\_/ ^  , 
^5 O /Q 1 ^  ^   ^^  V* V  ^  ^  ^  ^« V 'm -W» -v» ^  ^  "v» V . V ^  
—^  •— "• S-.-.C4. r> ^  ± 1 A_/C: -Li • ^ • 
Atkinson used a compatible variable because he felt that the presence 
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is experiencing higher costs [1, page 39]. Presumably, the greater the 
borrowing the more the firm is out of equilibrium and the higher will be 
operating costs (positive expected value of BORR). LSFOR and LSBY 
adjust for secondary market activity. A firm which sells a mortgage 
has the costs of originating and marketing the mortgage but the purchas­
ing firm will not experience these costs [1, page 5]. Thus, a firm 
which is a net buyer of mortgages would be expected to have lower 
operating costs (LSBY negative) and a firm which is a net seller of 
mortgages would be expected to show higher operating costs (LSFOR 
positive). 
Previous studies have included some variable to adjust for the 
number of branches of the association, the rationale being that 
branching is expensive to the firm. It is certainly recognized that 
branching is expensive; however, a branching variable is not included in 
this study because branching is an important ingredient for a firm 
to expand its output. This is particularly true with the presence of 
deposit rate ceilings as, under these circumstances, it is very 
difficult for the individual S£L association to compete for funds 
located in other geographical regions (accounts opened and maintained by 
mail) via higher deposit interest rates. Since, in all cases, it is 
important for a firm to have branches In orut;^ to --.aintain ics size, iz 
would be inappropriate to adjust for the number of branches. I- is 
felt that including the numàer of branches as an adjustment variable 
in the regression equation would filter out costs which are necessary 
for the association to maintain its size, and would thus distort the 
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actual cost-output relationship that is being measured. 
Functional Form 
A cubic equation was fitted to measure the total cost function. 
This form exhibits more flexibility than the various logarithmic forms 
used in previous studies as it is capable of measuring both economies 
and diseconomies of size and of producing an average cost curve with 
a finite intercept. 
2 
The exact equation measured is:" 
TOE = ASSETS + (ASSETS)^ + g (ASSETS)^ + 
8 
Z 9i+2 ^ (8) 
i=l 
where 
TOE = total operating expenses, 
ASSETS = total assets/1,000,000, 
AV_. = the ith adjustment variable, 
p. = the disturbance term. 
~A total cost curve of this form will result in an average cost 
curve of the form TOE/ASSETS = -r p, ASSETS 4- p„ (ASSETS)". This 
average cost function has a finite y-intercept O^). Also, if this 
. s— -A. * » At-* a  ^ V Q g c*. V (LLU. U. <W Vw'-»-  ^  ^ CL^ J.^  Ci. 
posi-ive value of 3^. iz will result in a "U" shaped average cost 
relationship. Including an intercept in the m.easiured total cost 
function would result in an average cost function of tne form 
TOE/ASSETS = 3„/ASSSTS + 8^ + B ASSETS + (ASSETS)"^, a function 
which is as>'mptctic to the y-axis. 
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The doublelogarithmic form was rejected because of its rigidities. 
It can measure either economies or diseconomies of size, but not both 
simultaneously. This form also places undesirable prior constraints 
on the shape of the resulting average cost curve. If a doublelog total 
cost function measures economies of size this will imply that the 
average cost function will be asymptotic to both axes.^ This may be the 
reason why previous studies have shown rather dramatic economies of 
size available for the relatively small firms and scarcely any 
available to the larger firms (for a comparison of results with a 
doublelog form, see the Appendix to this part). 
The translog functional form exhibits more flexability than the 
doublelog form in that the translog function is not constrained to be 
asymptotic to the x-axis and it is capable of producing somewhat of a 
"U"-shaped function. The translog fsanction will, however, produce an 
average cost relationship which is asymptotic to the y-axis. For this 
reason, the translog form, was also rejected. 
A doublelog function of the form. In TC = In 3-, In ASSETS is 
Q  ^ J. 
the sam.e equation as TC = Pq (ASSETS) . This translates into an average 
cost function of TC/ASSETS = g (ASSETS) If economies of size 
are measured, p. will be less rhan one and greater than zero, hence, 
-1 < (3-, - 1) < C. Letting (3, - 1) = -c, where 0 < c < 1, then 
TT /2 ccirmc; - a / / 5 ^ ^  a c sc:cTr"-nc ,oc: O / f^ ^ -..-it 
approach positive infinity and as ASSETS gets very large, 3n/'"22ETS)^ 
g-IDO—GS-cn zGiro. 
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It is strongly felt that the functional form of the measured total 
cost function should not be influenced by the nature of some assumed 
production function. Previous studies have based the functional form 
of the total cost function on the specific nature of some production 
function (a Cobb-Douglas form, for example). There is no reason to 
expect the production function applicable to an individual industry to 
be of a specific form; this is a testable hypothesis and not scmething 
that can be based on a priori information. Easing the form of the cost 
function on an arbitrary production function may place undesirable 
constraints upon its shape and, hence, may produce misleading results. 
In selecting a cubic total cost function, no consideration was 
given to the possible underlying production function. The important 
consideration here is the ultimate flexibility of the form of the total 
cost function used. 
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RESULTS 
The results of fitting equation (8) to the data of the metropolitan 
di. CdO incii d^ v^C; y -t-odo^ .. v^ o ^ w .u. « 
Table 15. The (ASSETS)^ coefficient in the Philadelphia sample did not 
prove to be significantly different from zero (-even at the 10% level); 
hence, this variable was excluded and a new regression was run. Also, 
the dummy variable DT was excluded from both the Philadelphia and New 
York samples as there are no stock associations permitted in these areas. 
The adjustment variables were only rarely significantly different 
from zero which may either indicate that the firms are more homogeneous 
than was expected and that the bulk of the variation in costs can 
be explained by the output variables ; or it may point to some statisti­
cal problems. The adjustment variables may not have shown enough 
variation or they may not be measuring the intended interfirm differ-^ 
ences. 
f igures 2 •chrough 5 show -che corresponûiriu LRAC xelciciuiisliiu» 
For example, from Figure 2 (the Chicago area), average operating coscs 
for the smallest associations amounted to, on the average, 0.9S3 percent 
of their total assets. 
i jL c:,^ d L.d— c: v_ij_dwii ui^  
adjustment variables eaual zero. 
Table 15. Regre:;sion result,;; of equation 
Variable 
ASSETS'^ 
(ASSETS)' 
(ASSETS)' 
RISK 
DC 
DT 
ALL 
LH 
WORK 
LSFOR 
LSnY 
PhiladeIphia Chicago 
6744 
(27.42)' 
-3.195 
(-9.32) 
27494 
(J.35) 
667.5 
(0.03) 
5012 
(0.74) 
138.8 
(0.29) 
-285.9 
(••0.10) 
12374 
(0.72) 
11095 
(1.74)* 
A* 
•A A* 
•A** 
9833 
(23.36) 
-5.392 
(-10.96) 
.520x10-3 
(11.19)*** 
-29403 
(-0.37) 
-74675 
(-1.15) 
-175476 
(-2.12) 
-2443 
(-0.18) 
1548 
(0.97) 
707.6 
(0.13) 
19751 
(4.03)* 
79096 
( 1 . 6 2 )  
Je * 
8 using ordinary least squares.^ 
Los Angeles New York 
Expected 
Sign 
7817 
(8.06)*** 
-0.7999 
(-3.31)*** 
,-5 
** 
3.791x10-
(2.51) 
88497 
(0.13) 
1003660 
(0.45) 
-259029 
(-0.12) 
4382 
(0.04) 
-21816 
(-1.09) 
56906 
(0.65) 
74827 
(0.50) 
-214453 
(-0.20) 
8202 
(9.32) 
-4.824 
(-3.84) * * * 
1.418x10-3 
(3.12)*** 
-20843 
(-0.12) 
-25553 
(-0.21) 
36336 
(0.65) 
-2083 
(-0.92) 
6032 
(0.67) 
-62598 
(-0.67) 
677.5 
(0.03) 
R 2 
F-stat j.f;Lic: 
SEE 
Sample E:izc; 
ASSET Range 
ASSET Mean 
0.9073 
664 
l.OOxlC^ 
70 
3.3-815 
%6.6 
0.9798 
715 
3.49x10^ 
163 
1.0-2814 
167.5 
a The t-stati.i.stic is in |parentheses. 
0.9715 
146 
2.02x10^ 
48 
14-11432 
1283 
* * 
ASSEI'S = Total assets/t. ,000,000. 
k 
Coefficient significan : at the 1% level. 
Coef f icieni: siynifican ; at the 5% level. 
Coefficient significan: at the 10% level, 
0.9808 
215 
3.34x10% 
43 
19-1976 
290.9 
92 
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Figure 2. The Chicago area long-run average cost relationship. 
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Figure 4. The Philadelphia area long-run average cost 
relationship. 
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'icjure 6. Area c(:m])airir.ons of LRAC relationships (cubic total cost functions). 
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By labeling the y-axis in this way, it is easy to compare the 
extent of the economies of size available to the different size firms. 
The difference between the minimum and the maximum points on the average 
cost relationships listed are 0.477, 0.401, 0.259, and 0.421 for the 
Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, and the Los Angeles areas, respectively. 
This would imply that, on the average, due to size efficiency the 
"optimal" size association in the Chicago area could, for example, pay 
0.477 percent more toward their liabilities and net worth than would be 
the case with the smaller associations. 
The Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles areas all show an upturn in 
their LRAC relationships which, at first glance, would seem to indicate 
diseconomies of size. However, as can be seen in the section on DATA 
LIMITATIONS AND STATISTICAL PROBLEMS, this may not be the case. Data 
limitations prevent the measurement of the true IRAC curve and these 
upturns could be due to the influence of short-run elements in the 
-easured average cost relationship. 
Even if one assumes that these measured LRAC relationships do 
indeed reflect the true IRAC curves, this in no way suggests thar 
regulatory authorities should completely abandon all efforts to encourage 
firm, growth. From che practical standpoint, the overwhelming majority 
of firms are nowhere near the point where diseconomies of size are 
iiiCCl <5 Vk J- CV» # -kAi OC4. f  ^  ^ O. V — O. 
iiovc: uw w v era- uciii. O—\u. i wj-vuoj- u v/ t-CJ- -.-ic i-iiCdOuL-i. 
Q o/-* ->0 0 7 (O -Î o c r-v o'v 
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What is important here is the nature of the economies of size 
that are measured. The downward sloping portion of the average cost 
relationships show a more uniform availability of economies of size 
rhan has been the case with previous studies. 
The actual shape of the true LRAC curve is important from the 
standpoint of actual policy decision making. If studies suggest a IRAC 
curve which measures economies of size only for the small associations, 
then there is no point, on the basis of operation efficiency, in 
encouraging larger sized firms. This study tends to counter previous 
of size. Certainly, more work is needed in this area to further test 
these claims. 
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DATA LIMITATIONS AND STATISTICAL PROBLEMS 
As mentioned previously, a long-run average cost curve cannot be 
Ci. o c-s.* Ox Awa. u. — J- uli X xio. ^ LXJ. c VwV j_ u-iic: w.ci i—a. • x i iiao ^ 
one would expect the measured LRAC relationship to lie above the true 
LRAC curve. However, the short-run nature of the data may produce 
another problem. The Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles areas all show 
an upturn in their LRAC relationships. This may be due to the presence 
of diseconomies of size or it may be due to the fact that the measured 
average cost relationship contains elements of both long-run and short-
run cost curves. As Figure 7 illustrates, suppose there are only 
three different sized firms in the market, then the measured LRAC 
relationship (dotted line) may get its upturn because it is being 
influenced by the upward sloping portion of SRAC^. However, the true 
LRAC curve may not exhibit any diseconomies of size over the range of 
outputs considered. It is strongly felt that the upturns in the 
râcâ.SUÏ<èO g.V^L"0mc: uuisc i eu-ci L U."CO TZnis Qâ-Cà piTOÎDiGIU ânO. 
 ^ C ^ "n/~i a 3 v~ I—\ I T-n /-»r»-i y—s J- . -C ^   ^^ ^ ^^  ^  ^^   ^
* — —' *—• w SMA  ^ *wAV I NM» S./* te  ^U. I A X Im. C<X L— 1 X CL L-  ^X X  ^ OL -X-  ^ fV 
large associations in each sample. An examination of the data reveals 
that for the Chicago area there are seven associations with assets of 
greater than S500 million (two associations with assets greater than 
$1.76 billion, the minimum, point on the LRAC relationship), the New York 
City area has six data points beyond the $500 million mark (one 
associaciori wi-ch assess grearer man $1.70 billion;, the Philadelphia 
area has eleven observations beyond the $200 million mark, and the Los 
Costs 
SRAC 
SRAC 
SRAC 
IRAC 
Output 
E'.Lgure 7. An examjple of a possible divergence, due to data limitations, between the long-
run average cost curve (IF.AC) and the measured long-run average cost relation­
ship (d'Dtted lint;) . 
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Angeles area has ten observations beyond the $1,000 million mark (one 
point beyond its minimum point of $10.5 billion). Whereas the large 
associations tended to be few, they also tended to be scattered rather 
uniformly over their output range. Within the Chicago area, for example, 
the seven associations with assets greater than $5 00 million tended to 
be distributed rather evenly throughout the $500 to $2,814 million range. 
This scarcity of large associations also casts doubt on the 
validity of the upturn in the measured LRAC relationships. With these 
upturns due to only one or two data points, one should be more skeptical 
than would otherwise be the case. 
To expand the number of observations in the $500 million plus range, 
the individual samples were pooled and a separate regression run (which 
included dummy variables to account for area differences). The result 
was an average cost relationship which was almost identical to that of 
the Los Angeles area. 
Plots of the regression residuals resulted in a cone-shaped 
pattern which indicates that the variance of the residuals is not 
constant over all ranges of output: as the size of the association 
increases, so does the variance of the residuals, whereas this 
heteroskedasticity does not result in biased estimators (with the use of 
I c c 4- i a V- «a c ^ ac-;- 4 m a 4- c a v ^  -n /-\f- «a-r -F 4 4 o"n T n 4 c 
of heteroskedasticity will result in an underestimation of the true 
variance of the estimators and, consequently, the type I error will be 
greater than the value assumed 117, page 260]. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This study is similar to previous studies in that it does indicate 
the presence of economies of scale. The primary difference with this 
study is in the shape of the IRAC function. Previous studies have 
produced IRAC curves which show the presence of rather dramatic 
economies of scale available for the relatively small firms while almost 
no economies of scale for the larger firms. This, however, may be a 
result of the functional forms used to estimate the cost functions (see 
the Appendix). 
The cubic total cost function used in this study has produced an 
average cost relationship which suggests that the LRAC curve decreases 
at a much more uniform rate and that there are economies of scale 
available even to the larger firms. The cost savings available to the 
larger firms varies from 0.259 to 0.477 percent of total assets. 
As with any empirical study, data and statistical problems arise 
\»T c-K a c h a H .^ *7 4- H a 1 C 4 o r-t "K /civ- ô 4 c- o 
problem with heteroskedasticity, the scarcity of large associations, and 
the short-run nature of the data. 
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APPENDIX: 
A COMPARISON OF RESULTS WITH A 
DOUBLELOGARITHMIC FUNCTIONAL FORM 
To demonstrate the different results, .that can be obtained by the 
use of a doublelogarithmic functional form, the regressions for each 
market areas were rerun using the same adjustment variables. The 
actual equation fitted was: 
8 
LNTOE = + 3^ LNASSETS 4- Z AV^ + p. (9) 
where 
LNTOE = In (TOE), 
LbJASSSTS = In (total assets). 
The regression results for each market area are listed in table 16 
In all cases the estimate of was significantly less than one (at the 
1% level) indicating the presence of economies of size. 
Uiitr W. _L_L CJ- Cii U  ^ _Lli J_ U.-i- C O KJ UA X J. -i.-k. • 
The results or the doublelog form tend to be similar to those found in 
previous studies; that is, rather substantial economies available for 
the smaller associations and very little economies available for the 
T —N y» ~ V  ^ xsw» vs ^  V ^ ^ ^ T ^  ^Ç C  ^/™\ 
the aajustment variables equal zero. 
Table 16. Regression results of equation 
Variable Philadelphia Chicago 
Intercept 
INASSKrS^' 
-3.149 
(-7.82)*** 
0.872 3 
(38.3)*** 
-3.301 
(-9.72)*** 
0.9040 
(51.8)*** 
RISK 
DC 
I )T 
AH 
LH 
BQ^R 
IBPœ 
LSBY 
0.050')7 
(1.43) 
0.01887 
(0.39) 
0.02003 
(1.69)* 
7.243x10-" 
(4.01)*** 
0.01029 
(J.90)* 
0.03341 
( 1 . 1 1 )  
0.01839 
(1.54) 
0.07557 
(1.54) 
-0.04365 
(-1.05) 
-0.01538 
(-0.28) 
<,159x10"^ 
(0.047) 
575x10-3 
(2.57)** 
9„643X10-3 
( 2 . 6 0 ) * * *  
0.01045 
(3.45)*** 
0.06331 
(2.12)** 
9 using ordinary least squares 
Los Angeles New Vork 
Expected 
Sign 
-2.150 
(-2.49)** 
0.8266 
(24.6)*** 
-2.619 
(-3.21)*** 
0.8532 
( 2 1 . 8 ) * * *  
0.05546 
( 0 . 6 6 )  
0.09956 
(0.99) 
0.4653 
( 1 . 8 0 ) *  
0.06154 
(0.89) 
-0.3198 
( - 1 . 2 6 )  
8.251x10-3 
(0.57) 
0.01042 
(1.17) 
0.02711 
(2.52)** 
0.03560 
(1.05) 
4.125x10-3 
do 34) 
5.894x10 
(1.09) 
-3 
0.02183 
(1.25) 
-1.697x10" 
(-0.01) 
-0.04647 
(-0.84) 
3.429x10 
(0.31) 
-3 
0.9720 0.965G 0.9664 
F-statistic 334 506 151 
SEE 0.17 5 0.213 0.235 
^The 1:-.stat j Stic is in parentheses. 
IN AS,'SETS =• ln(tot:al assi.^ts ) . 
* * * 
Coefficient significant, at the 1% level, 
* * 
Coefficient significant at the 5% level. 
•k 
Coefficient, significant; at the 10% level. 
9!) 5 4 
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.192 
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eu 
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)00 1,200 1,800 2,400 3,000 
Total Assets ($ Millions) 
Figure S. The Chicago area long-run average cost relationships: a 
comparison of the results of a cubic total cost function (CU) 
with a doublelog total cost function (DL). 
400 800 . = 200 1 . 6 0 0  2.000 
a comparison of the results of a cubic total cost function 
(CU) with a doublelog total cost function (DL). 
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^igure 10. 
200 600 800 1,000 
Toral Assers ($ Millions} 
The Philadelphia area long-run average cost relationships: 
a comparison of the results of a cubic total cost function 
(CU) with a doublelog total cost function (DL). 
0.5 H 
CU 
DL 
3,000 6,000 9,000 12,000 
Total Assets {$ Millions) 
riQure 11. "he Los Angeles-Long Beach area long-run average cost 
relationsnios: a Dir.parison of the results of a cubic total 
:o~al cosr function (DL) ' C!'  ^  ^  ^ t o I 
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i n d i c a t e  i  h e  p r o f o u n d  e f L e c t s  that a change i n  f o r m  can have on 
experimental results. 
In all of the comparisons the doublelog function produced an average 
cost relationship which fell below the corresponding average cost 
relationship produced by the cubic total cost function. This may be 
due to one or both of the following causes. First, the different 
functional forms used place different restrictions on the ultimate 
shape of the average cost relationships. These restrictions may have 
resulted in the above mentioned differences. Second, these average cost 
relationships are drawn given that all adjustment variables are equal to 
zero. Using different functional forms to measure the total cost 
functions, the various adjustment variables will take on a different 
degree of importance in terms of accounting for costs. That is, as 
the functional form is changed, so will the relative values of the 
adjustment variables. This fact may have caused the differences 
discussed above. 
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OVERALL SUMMARY 
The first part of this dissertation demonstrates the inability 
of the S&L industry to operate without deposit rate controls. An 
examination of the recent financial position of the federally insured 
S&Ls reveals that a relatively small increase in their average deposit 
rate would place a large number of SSLs on shaky financial grounds. 
If these deposit rate controls are to be successfully phased out, 
something must be done to substantially change their structure (that is, 
for example, the introduction and widespread use of variable rate 
mortgage instruments). 
Part II shows that economies of size do exist in the savings and 
loan industry. Based on samples of associations in the Chicago, 
Philadelphia, New York City, and Los Angeles-Long Beach areas, the 
results indicated the presence of economies of size. Furthermore, 
due to the use of a cubic total cost function, these economies tend to 
Ko ii'n 4 na ri i./Ks Ma c Koor-t en Krr -rNvoTr•?/-m-» c 4 ac 
109 
LITERATURE CITED 
Atkinson, Jay. "Firm Size in the Savings and Loan Industry." 
Invited Research Working Paper Number 29. Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board, Washington. D.C., December 1979. 
Atkinson, Sherry S. "Nonbank Thrift Institutions in 1977 and 
1978." Federal Reserve Bulletin 64 (December 1978): 927-935. 
Benston, George J. "Interest Payments on Demand Deposits and 
Bank Investment Behavior." The Journal of Political Economy 
72 (October 1964): 431-449. 
Benston. George J. "Cost of Operations and Economies of Scale in 
Savings and Loan Associations." In Study of the Savings and 
Loan Industry^ vol. 2, pp. 677-751. Directed by Irwin Friend. 
Washington, D.C.: Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 1959. 
Benston, George J. "Economies of Scale of Financial Institutions." 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 4 (May 1972); 312-341. 
Bodfish, H. Morton. History of Building and Loan in the United 
States, Chicago: United States Building and Loan League, 1931. 
Brigham, Eugene F. and Pettit, R. Richardson. "Effects of Struc­
ture on Performance in the Savings and Loan Industry." In 
Study of the Savings and Loan Industry, vol. 3, pp. 970-1209. 
Directed by Irwin Friend. Washington, D.C.; Federal Home 
Loan. Bank Board, 1959. 
. 'I'i TT n-TT w omi ; a-f- 4 o  ^Ttn t-no or S;^  r r 4 n rrc: 
Small Time Deposits at Commercial Banks and Thrift Insti­
tutions." Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 
64 (November/December 1978): 14-28. 
Cox, Albert H. Regulation of Interest Rates on Bank Deposits. 
School of Business Administration, The University of 
Michigan; 1966. 
Friedman, Milton, "Controls on Interest Rates Paid by Banks." 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 2 (February 1970): 
110 
11. Ganbs, Carl M. "Interest-Bearing Demand Deposits and Bank 
Portfolio Behavior." Southern Economic Jouxnal 42 (July 1975): 
79-82. 
12. Johnston, J. Statistical Cost Analysis. New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company^ Inc., 1959, 
13. ScaW^ird. u , "wiG Sin&ll Savsr*; Gcvgzti — 
ment Discrimination Against Small Savers During the Vietnam 
War." Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 2 (November 
1970): 513-522. 
14. Kane, Edward J. "Getting Along Without Regulation Q: Testing the 
Standard View of Deposit-Rate Competition During the 'Wild-
Card Experience.'" Journal of Finance 33 (June 1978): 
921-932. 
15. Kendall, Leon T. The Savings and Loan Business. Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice Hall. Inc., 1952. 
15. Leibenstein, Harvey. "On the Basic Proposition of X-Efficiency 
Theory." American Economic Review 68 (May 1978): 328-332. 
17. Maddala, G. S, Econometrics. New York; McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1977. 
18. McCue, Lisa J. "SSLs Report Cutting Mtge. Lending and Staffs in 
Squeeze." American Banker 14 May 1980. p. 3. 
19. McKelvey, Edward F. "Interest Rate Ceilings and Disintermediation 
Staff Economic Studies. Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve Syst.em.j Washington; D.C. ^ April 1975 = 
OP. T o -î /-sv-/-s.2>/-»•-% /-Nrm* C n mn 1 o/-Nr~. c 4-
Mortgages." In Alternative Mortgage Instruments Research 
<-•1 3 _ _ -! ? ——. •VTTT -I VT r r\ "U-- T-\ _ n ^  \A O u UU. y y VVJJ. • u ) WW # n. V —_L — V —^ w # ucu wy i./i-o. • 
Kaplan. Washington, D.C.: Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 
November 1977. 
21. Melton, William C., and Heidr, Diane L. "Variable Rare Mortgages." 
Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 4 (Summer 
22. News. Washington, D.C.: Federal Home Loan Bank Board, April 25, 
Ill 
23. Silverberg, Stanley C. "Deposit Costs and Bank Portfolio Policy." 
Journal of Finance 28 (September 1973): 881-895. 
24. Sivesindj Charles M. "Mortgage-Backed Securities: The Revolution 
in Real Estate Finance." Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve 
oai'iK Oil iMë'w xorK ^ vi^u"cuian x—i.u. 
25» J ÎCâjTcn. "SSeXjS See rîî-'C SWitCil to CDs,AmBÎTj-CâJi 3â.njC0ir 
7 May 1980, p. 1. 
26. Smith, James; Wiest, Philip; and Field, Alfred. "Demographic 
Study of Potential AMI Demand." In Alternative Mortgage 
Instruments Research Study, vol. 1, pp. IV-1 - IV-39. 
Directed by Donald M. Kaplan. Washington, D.C.: Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board, November 1977. 
27. "Statistical Series." Journal, Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
(December 1979): 35-35. 
28.  Winningham, Scott, and Hagan, Donald G. "Regulation Q: An 
Historical Perspective." Economic Review, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City (April 1980): 3-17. 
112 
ACKNOWLED GMENT S 
I express my sincere gratitude to the members of my commettee 
(Dr. Arnold Fad en. Dr. Roy Hickman. Dr. Wallace Huffman. Dr. Dudley 
Luckett, and Dr, Dennis Starleaf) who took time from their busy 
schedules to give me assistance when it was needed. Also, I would 
like to thank Dr. Roy Adams who performed excellently as a substitute 
committee member. 
A special note of thanks goes to Dr. Starleaf whose guidance and 
artful instruction greatly improved not only this dissertation, but 
my education here at Iowa State. 
